August 2015

A Message from Mike Loh, 11 August 2015

DefenseNews

August 10, 2015

COMMENTARY

Settle the A-10 Retirement Standoff

Satisfy Army’s Concerns, Ease Economic Blow

Gen. John Michael Loh, USAF Retired

The best way to resolve the interminable A-10 retirement debate is to satisfy both sides with a solution that eliminates the operational and economic arguments driving it.

The primary vocal critics of the Air Force decision to retire the A-10 close-support aircraft are Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., Sen. Kelly Ayotte, R-N.H., and freshman Rep. Martha McSally, R-Ariz. All three have strong ties to the A-10. Davis- Monthan Air Force Base in Tucson, Arizona, is home to the largest A-10 base. Closure of the base would have serious economic impact. Ayotte’s husband is a formerA-10 pilot. McSally flew A-10s in the Air Force.

The Air Force has presented strong operational arguments defending the retirement of the A-10: Other aircraft perform the A-10’s close-support mission today with the same effectiveness, and more survivability. The A-10 can only perform close support whereas other aircraft can perform close-support and other missions, thus offering more value in a smaller Air Force. And with today’s precision weapons and automation, pilots can train for both close support and other roles without sacrificing effectiveness.

Former A-10 pilots argue from an emotional point of view citing personal experiences. With the strong support of McCain, Ayotte and McSally, they have organized a support group and congressional contingent advocating retention.

But they have been unable to shoot down the rationale the Air Force puts forth in defense of retiring the A-10. Their arguments are laden with shrill, emotional points of view, but are mostly anecdotal and unpersuasive when measured against objective, logical reasoning.

Moreover, this ceaseless impasse is having adverse impacts on Air Force plans to field the F-35. To continue to operate the fleet of A-10s, it is necessary to forgo building up the maintenance force necessary to field the F-35. This slows the development of proficiency in Air Force F-35 pilots and, consequently, the operational readiness and competence of F-35 squadrons.

It also forces the Air Force to alter its rhythm to balance training, operational readiness and deployment commitments, creating a problem for combatant commanders who depend on having the F-35 in overseas theaters.

But there is a way to resolve this annual fight between the Air Force and A-10 advocates in the Army and Congress.

The Army likes the A-10 not just because of its attack capabilities but even more so because it is totally dedicated to close support of Army forces. The Army fears that without the A-10, and even though other aircraft can perform close support satisfactorily, the Air Force will not be there when needed.

To ensure the Army can depend on Air Force close support, the Air Force and Army should agree to negotiate a formal compact to team Air Force squadrons and controllers with Army brigades. Squadrons of F-16s, B-52s, B-1s and, soon, F-35s would be required to allocate a portion of their training to exercise and deploy with specific Army units. This teaming concept is not new but has not been enforced to the extent of this proposal.

An added benefit would be the close, symbiotic relationship that would bond the units, boosting team esprit and combat effectiveness, potentially more than exists today with the A-10.

To satisfy economic issues motivating opponents, the Air Force needs to ensure that Davis-Monthan AFB — the A-10’s master base with more than 80 A-10s and 4,000 jobs — remains a major Air Force installation and economic engine in Arizona. It must, therefore, replace the A-10s with another operational mission at the base and at smaller Air National Guard A-10 locations.

Because the Air Force will likely retain its existing bombers, it will need at least one other big base with large ramps, a long runway and modern facilities for its new stealth bomber, the LRS-B. Dispersal of bombers, particularly nuclear bombers, is also necessary for nuclear deterrence to work. There is no bomber base in the southwest. Monthan would be an excellent choice.

Monthan could also be a home for the KC-46A tanker, or the upcoming Air Force T-X trainer. Since Luke AFB near Phoenix is already a new F-35 training base, Arizona would then retain its two large bases with new, important Air Force missions, thus mitigating economic concerns.

For smaller Air National Guard A-10 units, the Air Force can find new missions at their locations as it does routinely during drawdowns and equipment changes.

The standoff between the Air Force and congressional opponents has become debilitating. Both sides need to work together for an amicable solution. Teaming Army and Air Force units for close support, and replacing A-10s with new aircraft at Monthan is a win-win for both.

General Loh is a former US Air Force vice chief of staff and former commander of Air Combat Command.

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March 2015

A Message from Mike Loh, 11 March 2015

Apply Desert Storm Lessons to Islamic State Campaign

Gen. John Michael Loh, USAF Retired

Feb. 28 marked the 24th anniversary of the end of the first Gulf War, Desert Storm, the only major war since World War II that ended in victory for the US, with all objectives met. Desert Storm is also notable for its remarkably short duration, only 42 days.

These facts stand in sharp contrast to our two major wars waged since then in Iraq and Afghanistan, both lasting more than a decade after the attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, which initiated them, and both marked by unclear military objectives and endless nation-building.

Now, we are engaged in an adjunct of the Iraq war against the Islamic State group, a war also notable for its lack of clear objectives and seemingly endless duration. To defeat this enemy, the US needs to adopt the same kind of strategy and mindset used so effectively in 1991.

What made Desert Storm so short and so effective were the clear military objectives laid down by President George H.W. Bush, the military strategy put together in the Pentagon leading with massive air power, and the leadership of Army Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf and Air Force Gen. Chuck Horner in directing the plan with relentless pounding by airpower, day and night for a month, allowing “boots on the ground” to finish the job in just four days. The result of this intense application of airpower followed by swift ground action was total victory; quickly, decisively, with overwhelming force and few casualties. This is the way modern wars should be fought.

Islamic State forces are deployed differently and are more scattered than were the Iraqi forces in Desert Storm. They control a larger area than the Kuwaiti theater. But the principles of applying intense air attacks and swift ground offensives are the same. Yet, we are fighting Islamic State with a misapplication of airpower, dribbling a few air attacks here and there with no clear objective other than to “degrade” the enemy. The contrast between Desert Storm and the war against the Islamic State group could not be more stark. President Bush clearly enunciated the military objectives for Desert Storm: Evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait, incapacitate Iraq’s leadership and military capability, and defend Saudi Arabia from Iraqi invasion. In short, get in, win and get out, leaving no occupation forces.

He left the military strategy and campaign plan to the generals and did not interfere. They put together a massive around-the-clock air campaign simultaneously attacking military targets in and around Baghdad and air attacks against Iraqi forces in Kuwait. And the plan deployed overwhelming ground forces to ensure they could quickly destroy the remaining “elite” Iraqi Republican Guard forces, free Kuwait and set the Iraqi military back for at least 10 years. The plan worked as designed. The one-two punch of intense airpower followed by overwhelming ground forces, then withdrawal from occupied territory, was the right strategy.

What followed the conclusion of hostilities was not an attempt at regime change and nation-building, but rather the imposition of effective “no-fly” zones throughout Iraq; Southern Watch from bases in Saudi Arabia, and Northern Watch from bases in Turkey.

Around-the-clock surveillance detected any military flights, movement of ground military vehicles and tracking of US aircraft by ground radars. Any movement or tracking was met with immediate, lethal attacks. The no-fly zones were effective, low cost and without casualties for the 10 years they were in effect.

Since Desert Storm, we have lost sight of the importance of clearly defined military objectives and building a campaign strategy to win quickly and decisively with airmen and soldiers working together. It is not too late to put together the same combination to win against the Islamic State group. The scenario is different, but the principles of warfare remain the same. The result may well be not just winning quickly and decisively, but the basis for deterring future IS-like movements. But the current approach against the Islamic State group will lead to neither victory nor deterrence, just endless, piecemeal warfare.

We should change course now, apply the lessons of Desert Storm, go on offense, and take the lead in the air and on the ground in the fight against the Islamic State group—to win.

General Loh is a former US Air Force vice chief of staff and former commander of Air Combat Command.

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O.K.! Which one of you guys didn't vote?

A Message from Dick Sexton, 4 March 2015

The AOG Board election results are in. I was not elected. I lost by one vote! I don't know if I am more relieved or disappointed, but it does make the point that every vote counts. I do, however, appreciate your support, not only during this election, but also as my time as President of the CAS. I will, of course, continue as your class representative on the CAS as long as you want me to.

Dick Sexton