
This is a collection of war stories about members of the
USAFA Class of 1960 as contributed by classmates.
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George Elsea A Tuy Hoa Ace Sampler Following four years at RAF Lakenheath I was assigned to the 510th TFS at Bien Hoa. Upon arrival in early November 1966 I was met at the airplane and told, “Don’t unpack; you’re assigned to the 308th Squadron and we’re leaving tomorrow for Tuy Hoa.” So I went to Tuy Hoa the next day on a C-130 while most of the other 308th pilots flew normal F-100 combat missions and recovered there. The base was in a state of hurried construction by a civilian contractor. There was an aluminum mat runway, taxiways, and parking ramp laid out on the sandy beach in Central South Vietnam which extended a couple of miles inland from the South China Sea. Tents had been erected for basic functions. Our squadron was immediately tasked to fly combat missions in bare base conditions out of “Tuy Hoa South.” (Tuy Hoa North was an existing US Army base north of the river.) About three or four weeks later the 31st Wing from Homestead AFB arrived with the 306th and 309th squadrons. The 308th was then returned to the 31st Wing. The 1966 Northeast Monsoon was exceptionally fierce. Strong winds and rain swept in off of the South China Sea with considerable effect. For the troops living in the tents it was like living inside a flag. Off base was off limits. There was not much to do other than fly missions when the weather permitted, eat C rations and Spam sandwiches in our makeshift crew dining room, or play cards and drink beer in the “Officers Club”. (It was a top priority self help project created from a clothes drying room the civilian contractors had used.) There was plenty of spare time. On an afternoon in early December 66 fifty knot winds and rain shut down flying. I began doodling on a sheet of airmail stationery. From random sketches appeared a decrepit generic fighter pilot. He evolved into a character used to depict many of the routine aspects of our life at Tuy Hoa at that time. I stuck cartoons on the wall of the “club” from time to time for the next six or eight months. By then the Ace had become a popular figure. Some of the pilots wanted to have the cartoons made up into a souvenir book. The original drawings that had survived posting in the bar were printed in Taiwan as “A Tuy Hoa Ace”. At Tuy Hoa our top mission priority was to give close support to the troops on the ground fighting the Viet Cong and the NVN regulars. We also supported army helicopter troop movements by bombing trees to create landing zones and suppressing enemy fire just before the troops arrived. We escorted “Ranch Hand” C-123’s to discourage anti aircraft fires coming from the jungles. We flew interdiction missions in Laos against the “Ho Chi Minh Trail” supply lines, and some in North Vietnam. But most preplanned missions were flown to attack “suspected VC locations”. In any of these missions the visible target was usually trees. And Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) from most missions was “No BDA due to Smoke and Foliage.” Hence “A Tuy Hoa Ace.”
An intelligence briefing was part of every preplanned mission. Because missions were similar most intel briefings were similar. One stands out in my memory. Shortly after we started flying out of Tuy Hoa, another guy and I were fragged to hit a radar van in Laos. This was a new place for us to go. The intel brief was similar to others with its “small arms fire possible” comment. When we approached the target area we found the FAC circling about ten miles from the target. He described it as being in the southeast of the bomb cratered area—no friendlies in the area. So we located the van and made several dive bombing passes. We got it dirty but had no direct hits so we asked the FAC if he wanted twenty mike-mike. After a pause he said, “Be my guest.” So we hammered it into a sponge with the guns on several low passes. We later learned that the target, a place called Tchepone, was one of the most consistently effective anti-aircraft sites in Laos. For some reason they didn’t fire a shot at us. When we stomped back to the intel briefer asking why he didn’t tell us the full story he said, “You didn’t have a need to know.”)
The “survival equipment we carried was invaluable if needed it but it was a little cumbersome. Conscientious personal equipment specialists in the squadrons maintained the gear and made sure we dumb pilots knew how to se it—just in case. We usually carried unofficial but important additional items such as baby bottles full of water—reportedly THE most important item to have in the event of a bailout into the jungle (to help get rid of “cottonmouth”.. I usually drank mine on the way back to the base when anti- aircraft fire was unlikely.
Somehow you were always on the early mission during the monsoon season. So, of course, were the ground crews.
Ground fire was often the least of the worries on close support missions. There were many Army flying machines in Vietnam particularly around a hot battle area. The traffic density was considerable especially at low levels where we made 500 mph bombing and strafing passes.
Ground Controlled Approach (GCA) Radar controllers need practice. Somehow it seemed that some new guy was practicing just when weather got interesting.
Actually an experienced controller was watching over the trainee’s shoulder ready to take over if requested or if the trainee made a mistake. (It says here.) The main problem with the radar at Tuy Hoa was that when the weather was really bad the temporary mobile equipment didn’t work well.
After flying and debriefing the last mission of the day we generally headed for the bar to swap lies and discuss important stuff. The routine included rolling dice to determine who would buy the next round of drinks.
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Most of you have read the numerous articles written about the Libyan attack, El Dorado Canyon, on 14 April 1986. You may not know that the JCS directed a dress rehearsal of that mission in October 1985, tasking the 20th Tactical Fighter Wing. This is the Operation Ghost Rider story. I was the 20th TFW DO from June 1979 to July 1980, the Wing Vice Commander from June 1981 to February 1984, and the Commander from February 1984 to July 1986. By way of background, the 20th transferred from Weathersfield flying the F-100 to RAF Upper Heyford flying the F-111E in 1970. Initially the wing only flew the nuclear mission, but slowly achieved conventional capability and weapons over the next few years. We had major problems in the last half of 1976. President Jimmy Carter withdrew virtually all the Air Force and Navy spares money and transferred it to social programs. He even thinks he did the right thing to this day. However, the effect of his action dramatically decreased the mission capability of our combat units. At Upper Heyford, our MC rates were below 50%. It was difficult to maintain our aircrew proficiencies and our maintenance crews worked overtime canning parts off aircraft to repair others. The effect was most pronounced when I became the DO in 1979. Meanwhile, the USSR became stronger each year and amassed huge forces along the eastern border of NATO. In 1980, I attended a seminar presented by a number of prominent speakers at USAFE Hq. One was the US Ambassador to NATO. After his speech, I asked him what his and NATO’s analysis was about our chances of a war in Europe in the next 2 years. His answer: 50-50 between war and no war. That was a sobering statement. He also said that when the USSR felt they could win a quick conventional war, they probably would attack. Fortunately, President Reagan reversed our spares problem very early and we began to get the parts we needed by about mid-1982. Our MR rate began climbing to 75% and then 85% by 1985. When I became the Wing Commander in the spring of 1984, the USAFE DO suggested we should train to fly 4 ship formations to improve our conventional capability. I readily agreed and said I had decided to proceed in that direction. Up to that time we only flew the F-111 in 2 ship formation, principally because of the side by side configuration and reduced visibility to the starboard. I called the DO back in 2 months and told him we were all 4 ship qualified and that I had recently led a 10 flight 40 aircraft formation. I had not flown that way since my F-100 days. In the summer of 1984 we deployed each squadron through a 2 week course at Red Flag at Nellis. I must say it was a blast; particularly when I dropped 12 MK-82 retard high explosive bombs on a TAC range. The training measurably improved our conventional weapons capability. As USAFE increased their MC rates and aircrew proficiency in conventional deliveries, we began to match the Soviet conventional capability and that threat was reduced. At about 5:30 AM on the morning of October 16th 1985, I received a called from our command post on my bedside hot line. We had previously been alerted for a NATO “Active Edge” exercise, a conventional munitions loadout, so I assumed we were getting the execution. Sure enough, it was an Active Edge message, but my emergency action officer said it was an unusual message, and suggested I come up right away to review it. It was in the command post in 15 minutes. The message said the 20th Tactical Fighter Wing was excused from Exercise Active Edge. I was totally surprised because Active Edge applies to all NATO assigned and earmarked units and exceptions were rarely made. About that time, my communications center next door gave me a second message saying an aircraft was inbound to Upper Heyford, landing at 6:00 AM, and requested that I meet it on arrival. I expected it was some kind of inspection team – we had those all the time. I called my Operations Officer, Colonel Bill LaTulipe, and Maintenance Officer, Colonel Pat Barry, and told them to meet me on the base operations ramp. When the team of 5 officers got off their aircraft, they handed me a letter which directed the 20th Tactical Fighter Wing to bomb a simulated runway target at geographical coordinates 52-31.5N, 61-47.3W at 1016 ZULU on 18 October with 10 F-111Es loaded with 8MK82 retarded 500 pound inert bombs, and then return to Upper Heyford. The mission was to be accomplished in the strictest secrecy and the team was there to assist in coordinating outside help as required. I did not know where those coordinates were, so Bill LaTulipe and I walked into Base Operations and plotted them on the world-wide map on the wall. To my surprise, the target was in Eastern Canada about 100 miles southwest of Goose Bay, Labrador, a remote wilderness area – nearly 3,000 miles away. 1016 ZULU was just about sunrise in the target area. After a bit of calculating, Bill and I concluded that it was about a 6-hour flight one way, and that we had less than 46 hours to plan the mission and to generate the aircrews and aircraft before we had to launch. To my knowledge, no fighter wing had ever been tasked to perform a mission of this magnitude before on a no-notice basis. It sounded like an enormous task, and it was. The 3 of us went back to the Command Post, and I selectively recalled some of the senior battle staff. Bill, Pat, and I drew up a quick outline of what we had to do. In maintenance we had to identify our best night, TFR, low-level aircraft, get them in top shape, configure them to carry the munitions, get the bombs out of the munitions storage area and loaded on the aircraft, and plan for complete aircraft systems checks before take off. In operations we had to identify the aircrews, plan the route, arrange for aerial refueling, accomplish detailed low-level flight planning, build strip maps, develop radar predictions of the target, work up defensive tactics for the simulated enemy defense, develop a minimum communications plan, define pre-take off and post-take off abort procedures, ground and air spare procedures, and build a night taxi plan. To meet out TOT, our aircraft would need to launch several hours before dawn from Upper Heyford. In the support area we had to refine our base security plan, develop an air traffic control plan for com-out operations, and arrange for base quarters, meals, and transportation for our aircrews. It was obvious that it was going to be a base-wide effort, ultimately requiring the assistance of virtually every squadron and agency in the wing. There were some early decisions we had to make – First, which aircrews would we select? From the beginning that was my most difficult decision. My dilemma was whether I should lead the mission or serve as the mission commander from the lead KC-10 tanker as required by the tasking letter. I finally decided to be the mission commander in the tanker with overall command and go-no-go authority, and that the DO would fly the lead F-111 aircraft. My three fighter squadron commanders, L/COL Joe Narsavage, 55th TFS/CC, L/COL John Cain, 77th TFS/CC, and L/COL Pete Granger, 79th TFS/CC then volunteered to lead elements. All were highly qualified pilots and super leaders. We selected the most proficient aircrews from each squadron and one stan eval crew from the wing. We decided to launch 4 airborne spare aircraft in case a primary aircraft experienced problems and back them up with 4 more ground spares. The selected aircrews had to be notified and a 24-hour schedule built that identified who would plan the mission, conduct the mass briefing, build their low-level mission folders, eat, go into crew rest for 8 hours of sleep, then get up for the final breakfast, briefing, pre-flight, engine start, taxi and take off for each crew. Preparation and planning Wednesday and Thursday were hectic, but we finally got it all put together. The aircrews spent several hours working on their low-level mission folders and radar predictions of their turn points and the target area. We conducted the mass aircrew briefing on Thursday afternoon and put the aircrews into early crew rest in the Bachelor Officer Quarters. I was concerned about our ability to maintain the required security over all aspects of the mission, and we emphasized security to all those involved. Unknown to me, USAFE Headquarters had dispatched a communications surveillance team to our base to monitor all our telephones and radios. In their debrief after the mission they commended our security because no useful information had been intercepted. The greatest potential compromise was through the Officers’ and NCO’s Wives Clubs. With so many of our people working on the mission and our aircrews cloistered into the Bachelor Officer Quarters, it became apparent to several of the wives that something big was going on. The wife of our local OSI detachment commander told her husband something was happening, and he ran an independent attempt to find out what was going on, but didn’t get any useful information either. Our security was superb. On Thursday night, I flew to RAF Mildenhall to brief my boss, Major General Tom McInerney, and the KC-10 and KC-135 crews who were supporting the mission. At 0425 Friday morning the F-111s took off from Upper Heyford, followed a few minutes later by 7 tankers from RAF Mildenhall. We had planned to rendezvous the force over Machrihanish Island in Scotland, about 250 miles to the northwest. Due to an air traffic delay, our tankers got behind schedule and the F-111s were strung out ahead of the tankers instead of being in trail of them as planned for the rendezvous. The fighter formation was initially in 2 ship elements separated by one minute or about 8 miles in trail. That made the fighter string about 40 miles log. We were using comm. out procedures and in and out of the weather so the rejoin was difficult and complicated. I came very close to terminating the mission during that rejoin, but I finally broke radio silence and told the crews where we were. Finally after about 40 minutes we got all 14 F-111s on their assigned tankers and cycled each one through for a refueling check of the aircraft systems. Our 10 primary aircraft were all OK at this point, so I sent the 4 airborne spares home. Two aerial refuelings were conducted over the ocean on the 6 hour flight to the target, and our F-111s had to change tankers after the first refueling. We used 17 tankers in all, with 6 meeting us in mid-Atlantic from the U.S. on the way over and 4 coming out of Mildenhall, England, on the way home. Each F-111 required about 70,000 pounds of jet fuel during the mission in 4 refuelings. When we finally got settled down on track I discovered that we were 9 minutes behind schedule and then found that we had an unexpected 75 knot headwind. We increased our airspeed to the KC-10 max cruise, and finally made up the deficiency by our last checkpoint. The F-111s made their last refueling and descended to low-level 150 miles east of their first land check point at Bell Island, Newfoundland, where they went into a low-level timing orbit. Each aircraft left the orbit point separated by 1 minute from the aircraft ahead and flew their night, low-level route as a single ship. The route was flown at 400 feet above the ground and 480 knots on their automatic TFR systems. Total communications-out procedures were followed all the way to the target which was about 350 miles from the coast in point. The terrain in the target area was mountainous, covered by dense forests, and had many lakes and rivers throughout the area – a low level radar navigation nightmare. The target was a simulated runway outlined by 5 pairs of radar reflectors 250 feet apart and spaced at 2,000 foot intervals. Each aircraft had a distinct aiming point, as we were trying to simulate cutting the runway into segments of less than 2,000 feet. A special support team had erected the reflectors on the day before the flight, and had to rebuild 2 of them that were torn down by brown bears that night. The team remained on site and observed each aircraft’s bombing run, checked our timing, and scored each bomb that dropped. They videotaped each aircraft’s bomb run, but unfortunately it was too dark to get good video pictures. Colonel Bill LaTulip was first across the target. He was within 5 seconds of his scheduled TOT. As I recall, all 8 of his bombs impacted with the simulated runway area for a perfect score. The following crews were all close to being on time – the worst was about 15 seconds late – after a 6-hour flight. Timing was critical because the bomb runs were 1 minute apart – and fragmentation patterns from previously dropped bombs last about 35 seconds. Even though our bombs were inert, we treated them as actual weapons. Of the 80 bombs dropped, over 50% impacted the simulated runway – for a pretty good record. It was still nearly dark at TOT and the bombing runs were made on radar only. A couple of the 500 pound bomb retarding devices failed and those bombs went long of the target. One aircraft could only get one bomb off on the first pass because of a release malfunction, so he had to make a couple of jettison passes in the area since our aircraft didn’t have the fuel to make it back to the United Kingdom with bombs on board the aircraft. In the final analysis, however, the control team determined that we had cut the runway at each designated point. The first 9 aircraft got joined back up with our tankers on schedule, but I had to turn the entire string around and go back to pick up the last aircraft with the release problem. He was pretty low on gas when he got joined up, and I’m certain you can appreciate the pilot’s voice when he reported, “I’m taking on fuel.” The flight home was very uneventful. It was daylight by then and the clouds that bothered us earlier were gone. My only concerns were aircrew fatigue and meeting up with the last 4 tankers in mid-Atlantic. Neither concern proved to be a problem. The F-111s landed at Upper Heyford shortly after 1600 in the afternoon and I got back a little later. The crews were still enthusiastic and excited when we debriefed the mission. We began our analysis of the mission that night. Several important lessons were learned and documented, such as how much time you need to thoroughly plan such a mission, better fighter-tanker rendezvous procedures, and having each F-111 element stay on one tanker throughout the flight instead of moving them around at night in the weather in a large formation. We also should have conducted better tests of each aircraft’s weapons systems and bomb racks. We prepared a detailed after-action report for USAFE that proved valuable for later missions. During the next week, I received a message from General Charles Gabriel, then Air Force Chief of Staff, in which he praised our mission results and said it was the first modern long-range demonstration of the capabilities of tactical air power. We also received congratulations from the USAFE/CC, General Charles Donnelly. I learned later that our mission, designated Operation “Ghost Rider” was the dress rehearsal for the Libyan raid. It was declassified at the end of the year. The lessons we learned and documented came in very handy for that operation. In late December 1985, the 20th Wing and our tenant unit, the 42nd Electronics Combat Squadron, along with the 48th Tactical Fighter Wing at RAF Lakenheath, received very sensitive warning orders concerning a possible air strike against Libya. These orders came shortly after terrorist bomb attacks were conducted against the Rome and Vienna airports on December 17th in which 19 people were killed, including 5 Americans. Following these attacks there was much speculation in the international media about possible U. S. military retaliations. On January 3rd 1986, we were all shocked when the U. S. national news media specifically identified F-111 bases in England at Lakenheath and Upper Heyford as possible units to be used in an attack on Libya. The report, broadcast on CBS Evening News was shown on BBC TV the following evening. The report was of great concern to me for 2 reasons: First, it could compromise any possible operation from our bases, and second, it might make us targets of Libyan terrorist operations. The Libyans had previously killed a British policewoman in London the year before, and were known to be capable of mounting an operation against our United Kingdom bases. The publicity generated a great deal of public interest and both Lakenheath and Upper Heyford were immediately besieged by camera crews from the U. S. and U. K. major TV networks. Their film, shown over the next few days, included a fairly accurate analysis of F-111 capabilities and possible tactics we might use in an attack on Libya. We tried to keep as low a profile as possible. News media inquiries were referred to higher headquarters without further comment, and I briefed our personnel not to make any personal statements to the press. We were tasked to begin contingency planning for the retaliatory raid on Libya at that time. Initially, only the F-111F models stationed at RAF Lakenheath were considered in the planning, but later our EF-111 tactical jamming aircraft, the “Raven” assigned to the 42nd Electronic Combat Squadron was included and then the 20th’s F-111Es were added to the planning operation. Because of the extreme sensitivity of the mission, I used only about 25 key officers and NCOs in the planning process. Many target options and different strike packages were put together over the next few weeks. As you know, U. S. Navy carrier aircraft also participated in the mission. Coordination between the Navy and Air Force was excellent – and we even put several of our officers out on the carriers in the Mediterranean to enhance the interservice cooperation. There were some speculations that the news leaks about the ability of our F-111s and Naval air power to inflict considerable damage to Libyan targets might deter further Libyan-sponsored terrorist attacks. Unfortunately, that was not the case, and the terrorist activities continued. On the 2nd of April a bomb exploded on a TWA airliner flying over Greece, killing 4 Americans, including a young woman and her infant daughter. In the early morning hours of 5 April, another bomb exploded in the LaBelle Disco in West Berlin, injuring hundreds and killing 2 people, including an American. These incidents were obviously targeted against Americans, and were clearly connected to Libya by a strong trail of evidence as disclosed by the President. The disco bombing apparently was the final factor in the President’s decision to execute the El Dorado Canyon mission. When the final approval and execution message was received from headquarters, 18 F-111Fs from Lakenheath were tasked to do the bombing, supported by 4 EF-111As from Upper Heyford. The F-111Fs from Lakenheath were chosen because they were equipped with pave tack pods which gave them excellent night visibility with their infrared system and laser precision guided bombs. Quite by coincidence, both the 20th and the 48th wings had scheduled week long local training exercises to begin on Monday, April 14th. The exercises were excellent cover for the mission preparations. Our forces took off from Lakenheath and Upper Heyford Monday evening, with the supporting refueling tankers coming from Mildenhall and RAF Fairford. Because both France and Spain had denied overflight rights to our forces, our crews had to fly southwest from England, over the Atlantic, and into the Mediterranean Sea through the Straits of Gibraltar. The flight to the targets required 3 aerial refuelings and over 6 hours enroute. Our aircrews dropped off the tankers and descended to low-level well outside of Libyan radar range. A few minutes before the coordinated attack began at 0200 Tripoli time, the EF-111A Ravens popped up from low-level and began jamming Libyan radars. Our Navy and Air Force crews began bombing precisely at 0200. Our F-111s attacked targets in the Tripoli area in 2 waves, coming from the East and West to avoid early radar detection. The crews apparently achieved near total surprise since no guns or missiles were fired at them until after the first couple of aircraft dropped their bombs. Subsequent anti-aircraft artillery fire was ineffective and none of the aircraft were hit by hostile fire. One F-111F and its aircrew was lost over water, inbound to the target, from unknown causes. All the targets were struck with some degree of success. As you could see on national TV later, some of the pave tack infrared systems were hampered by low clouds and smoke from previously dropped bombs. Our crews had been briefed to avoid collateral damage to civilian areas and not to drop their bombs unless they were confident their bombs would impact on the targets. To their credit, some of our crews did not drop their bombs because the targets were obscured by smoke or clouds, or due to equipment malfunction. Those crews were really disciplined. It took determination, training and will-power not to drop their bombs after a 6-hour flight, and while flying through a gauntlet of anti-aircraft fire and missiles. I’m very proud of them. The President and Secretary of Defense briefed the mission on national TV immediately following the attack. It was still Monday evening in the U.S. Within hours a host of U. K. and international news media teams were entrenched around our base at Upper Heyford. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher admitted to giving clearance for our F-111s to fly from England and was immediately criticized by the opposition parties. But the coverage was generally neutral in the U. K. Within a few days, film clips came out of Libya showing damage to several civilian targets. I recall one in particular. It was a shot of people pulling what the Libyans called a U. S. bomb out of the wreckage of a building. The so-called U. S. bomb was actually and unmistakably the booster rocket from a Soviet-made SA-3 surface-to-air missile which had been fired by the Libyans. I’m sure that a great deal of the damage to civilian targets in Tripoli was caused by their own gunfire and missiles that dropped back on the city. British public opinion was mixed. The Labor and Social Democratic Parties strongly criticized the raid. My office received about 400 telephone calls, of which about 40 percent were in favor and 60 percent against. I also received over 300 letters, about one-half of which favored our actions. Since we could not rule out the possibility of retaliation from the Libyans, we significantly increased security at all our bases in the U. K. The El Dorado Canyon mission was a great success from the standpoint of a carefully planned, coordinated and executed joint operation between the U. S. Navy and U. S. Air Force. |
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Bill Kornitzer Mission to Iran: Desert One
I first became involved with the Iran hostage rescue mission in the fall of 1979, while I was serving as the Deputy Director of Operations for the 437TH Military Airlift Wing at Charleston AFB, SC. The Wing Commander and I were briefed on a possible mission to Iran to secure the freedom of American hostages being held in Tehran. At this time Charleston’s C-141’s were providing domestic airlift support for the Army Ranger and Delta Force personnel who would be the main forces involved .with the mission.
In January 1980, I became Director of Operations. Because of the number of people (hostages and their rescuers) to be extracted from Tehran had increased to approximately 330, the MAC Assistant Director of Operations made a rare visit to Charleston to personally brief me and our selected crews on an expanded role for our Wing. This number included 53 hostages, 120 in the Delta Force team, 100 Rangers and as many as 56 helicopter crew members that would have to be extracted out of Manzariyeh, Iran. This airfield was a few miles south of the American Embassy in Iran.
Training
In January 1980, we selected our most capable and highly qualified crew members to fly the mission. I personally briefed them on the importance of security and told them that I only wanted volunteers for this mission. As one would expect, I ended up with [number] highly motivated and capable crews. We started our blacked out landing training with night vision goggles (NVGs) at North Field, which was a small satellite base north of Charleston. This mission was very sensitive and its success hinged on total security. We took extraordinary efforts to keep this mission known only to the crew members involved and the people needed to support us. In fact I was not allowed to brief the Wing Commander on our specific role and I carried orders from the Commander of MAC that required the entire Command to support my request no questions asked, period!
After our training at North Field, we did more extensive training at an abandoned airfield in Florida. The crews were doing real well and getting used to NVGs. I then took our crews to an extensive training session at the Tonopah Range in the vicinity of Nellis AFB, Nevada. After this training, I declared our crews ready to perform low level flight operations in blacked out conditions, no radio calls; and using only NVGs to land in total darkness. This was a first for MAC crew members in large jet aircraft. Of course, the MC-130 crews at Hurlburt Field were capable of doing this, and would be used to insert the Delta and Ranger Forces at the Desert One initial landing site.
Joint Training
After we were qualified to perform at night, we participated in numerous dress rehearsals with the MC-130, AC-130, KC-135 and RH-53 crews and the Delta and Ranger Forces. These exercises included mock surprise night assaults on active duty bases in the US and then departing before day break. These exercises were monitored by high ranking officers from Washington to insure we were capable of doing the tasked mission. After we had successfully completed numerous exercises our Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander, Major General James B. Vaught, U.S. Army declared us ready to go and briefed the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, after that, President Jimmy Carter.
Deployment
ON 18 April 1980 I was picked up at Charleston and flown to Andrews AFB in Washington. I departed Andrews AFB with General Vaught and the rest of the JTF staff. We arrived at Wadi Kena, Egypt, at 0230 AM on 20 April 1980. I was the COMALF [Commander of Airlift Forces] and all MAC resources supporting the mission were under my command, as directed by the MAC Commander, General Dutch Huyser. We set up schedules, met and briefed crews, and assigned aircraft for missions, etc. On the first day of deployment for the actual mission, I flew with my crews to serve as the MAC on-scene commander at Daharan, Saudi Arabia and then to move forward to the extraction area at Manzariyeh, Iran as the mission progressed.
During the period 20-22 April, all the forces that were to participate in the mission arrived. On the 23 and 24 April all the forces would start to move forward. The MC-130's, EC-130's [ fuel carriers], and Delta force would go to Masirah, Oman. These aircraft would all leave Oman on the 24th to meet up with the RH-53 helicopters at the Desert One site to refuel the RH-53s and transfer the Delta teams to the helicopters for their forward movement to the Tehran Area. I departed on the 24th for Daharan, Saudi Arabia. Our mission was to leave Daharan on the night of the 25th to arrive at Manzariyeh, Iran 10 minutes after the airfield was secured by the Ranger force. We would carry highly qualified medical personal, including surgeons, to treat the injured.
At Daharan, the Saudis would not let me offload anyone except crew members unless I let them inspect the aircraft. I refused, because we had weapons, secure radios, medics, Army personnel, etc. We were pretending this was a normal MAC mission into Daharan and nothing else. A few of the crew members went with me to the hotel to set up our secure satellite radio to monitor the mission and to get our final orders, We were only there for a few hours when we got the word the mission had been aborted. A minimum of six fully operational helicopters were needed to transport the Delta force to a holding area near Tehran in order to have a force deemed capable of success and only five helicopters were available out of the eight that departed the aircraft carrier the Nimitz in the Persian Gulf.
I stayed at Wadi Kena till late on the 26 of April, supervising the remaining MAC aircraft and crews as we loaded all remaining personnel and supplies and flew home. I was awarded the Defense Meritorious Service Medal for my role in the operation.
Aftermath
This was a very disappointing outcome for all of us who had worked so long and hard to make it a success. It was devastating to lose eight crew members in an unfortunate accident and have to leave them behind. One remarkable thing about this mission was the scope i.e. the distances and the amount of forces that had to be involved. It was also a tribute to every one that this vast operation was kept a secret.
Today
I later became the commander of all Air Force Special Operation forces at Hurlburt Field, Florida, as the 2ND Air Division Commander. Today Special Operations qualified aircrews and maintainers are better equipped and trained then we ever have been to conduct sensitive and highly covert missions. |
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Ed Leonard Behind Barbed Wire: A POW’s Story
On the third day, Kenny was finally rescued, but I was spotted and captured. I was taken prisoner by a badly mauled North Vietnamese division dragging itself out of South Vietnam and moving northward through Laos following their defeat during the Tet Offensive. This was a problem for both sides. You see, we were not bombing Laos--we said so. And Ho Chi Minh's army was not in Laos--he said so. I was an embarrassment to both governments, a long way from home, and a bullet cost twelve cents. After an initial interrogation, I was force marched each night for a week through bombed jungle. At last I was herded into a cave where I spent the day. At dusk, I was put on a truck, and was bolted, face-down, to the bed. All night the truck would jar, bumble, and roll, side to side, fore and aft, and up and down, like a repetitiously interrupted corkscrew. After stumbling into the morning, we at last came to a halt several hundred yards off the road, under trees and camouflage netting. Periodically, the truck would stop on the edge of a village. I’d be off-loaded and my arms bound behind my back, then I’d be pulled by a noose about my neck through the village, through an inevitable gauntlet of angry villagers armed with clubs, jabbing sticks, and rocks, all whipped to a frenzy by a small band of political organizers. Once through the village, I’d be put back on the truck, and once again we’d bumble and stumble through the night. Near sundown each evening, the truck would start off again for another bone-jarring night along rough bomb-cratered roads and rocky stream-beds. After a week, I was off-loaded on the edge of a broad valley and marched several miles across rice paddies to a wooded jungle rise. Under the tree canopies were bamboo cages, containing American servicemen and civilians, a number of Canadians, and a German nurse. I was placed in a bamboo cage removed from the others. The second evening in camp, the other prisoners were taken out of their cages and moved out. Shortly after, two guards opened my cage and motioned me out. I was led down a trail and emerged on the edge of a large open field. There was a small creek meandering to one side and I could see the others bathing in it. My guards stopped me a short distance upstream from the others and indicated I was to wash. The muddy water was waist deep and, after two weeks, I definitely needed a bath.. The sun had been down for some time, but the sky to the West was still slashed with bands of red and orange. Even the guards appreciated the sight. I turned my head at the gentle sound of gurgling water. A head emerge from the murk: "I'm Paul Montague, Captain, United States Marine Corps, the Senior Ranking Officer. Who are you?" "I'm Ed Leonard, Captain, U.S. Air Force." "What's your date of rank?" he asked "December '64". As his head sank back into the water he said, "Now you're the Senior Ranking Officer--you poor son-of-a-bitch." I spent a total of three and a half years in solitary, during which I had many opportunities to reflect upon Paul's remark. Our duty as prisoners was to escape, to resist all attempts by the enemy to exploit us for propaganda, and to give each other whatever help and comfort we were able to provide. We had a tight organization in the camp. Although told often there was no rank, whenever the enemy discovered our activities, the instigator and I would be called upon for some form of penitence--inevitably painful. That autumn, we moved to Duong Khe, an old French military post some twenty miles outside Hanoi--our battlefield for the next two years. The buildings were concrete with interior rooms of varying size. If you've seen the movie "Papillion" with Dustin Hoffman and Steve McQueen, you've seen the place. The French built them all over the world. Here I was segregated from the others. Those captured in Laos were held in a separate part of the camp--very ominous. The others, mostly enlisted ranks, had been taken in South Vietnam. In all, there were 87 enlisted, 12 officers, and 7 civilians. I was moved away from my enlisted men (78 soldiers and marines captured in South Vietnam and Cambodia during the Tet Offensive) about a year before release. They put me in with seven others also captured in Laos. We were called the LULUs, the Legendary Union of Laotian Unfortunates. As a rule, the officers and senior NCOs were held in solitary, but, using the tap code, we were able to establish good communications between cells in the building within a few days, and within a few months, to the other buildings in camp. One morning, eighteen months after arriving at Doung Khe, the door to my cell opened and Paul was lead in. We were out of solitary! For the next three days, we both talked steady streams, after that we started, occasionally, listening to each other. Paul, a career Marine, was deeply concerned for his family; he had no way of knowing if his wife and children had been informed of his capture. He would have been unhappy to learn he'd been killed in action. Paul had already seen the depth of hurt prolonged separation had inflicted upon his daughter. Some years before Vietnam he'd returned home from an eighteen month unaccompanied tour of duty in Korea. He'd arrived on a Friday afternoon during the school year; had a wonderful reunion with his family. Monday morning, at breakfast, his daughter, then in first grade, eagerly went to work on him. "Daddy, will you meet me after school and walk me home? "Sure, Pam, just tell me where." Whereupon Pam produced a very detailed map, showing how to get to school, the main entrance, and a big red "X" next to the flag pole "You won't forget, will you, Daddy?" "No, Pam, I'll remember." “Daddy, will you wear your uniform?" "I really don't want..." "Please, Daddy, Pulleesss..." Shirley chimed in, "Wear it, Paul." So it was settled, and Paul, in dress uniform, left the house shortly after three, arriving at the flag pole as the school bell rang and a horde of children disgorged from the front door. But, no Pam. Paul waited, impatiently at first, then a bit anxiously. He checked his map...there was no mistaking the crayon drawing, he was where designated. Finally, as the playground cleared of the initial wave, Pam appeared, accompanied by half a dozen of her little friends. Spotting her father, she tossed her head triumphantly and marched directly toward him, her friends straggling sheepishly behind. Arriving a short distance in front of Paul, she stopped, spun about, and putting her little fists to her hips, half shouted at the other children in a voice trembling with anger and pride: "You see, I do too have a Daddy!" Imagine listening to Paul, a ragged, starved scarecrow of a man, sitting in the gloom of a prison cell telling me this story of his daughter, ten years earlier. How must Pam have felt during her father’s Memorial Service? Did she remember her defiant cry, "I do too have a Daddy!"? (Paul was repatriated with me and now lives in Kansas with his wife, Shirley.) The over-riding emotion of prolonged imprisonment in solitary confinement is boredom. The first time you are in solitary it takes roughly two weeks to establish a routine. First thing in the morning is a prayer followed by some exercises then sitting on the floor letting the mind wander. Boredom sets in and you walk inside the cell. Keep your eyes on the crack under the door since you are required to sit on your mat and not move. Any guard approaching will cause a slight shift in the light under the door giving you enough time to get to your rice mat and sit down. Eyes on the crack quickly became a way of life. With time various events are added. The exercises quickly become the daily dozen. Dozen indeed...it became fifteen. And rather than one set in the morning it became fifteen sets of fifteen. The Morning Prayer became a church service with hymns and the Apostle’s Creed interspersed with bible passages memorized years before in Vacation Bible School. After church, another set of the Daily Dozen. The highlight of the morning was “The Count”. How many days before Labor Day? (Sing “I’ve been working on the Railroad”.) Day’s till Suzanne’s Birthday? (Sing “Happy Birthday to her”) Day’s till Halloween? (Sing “Caspar the Friendly Ghost”) Each holiday and family birthday had its song. After The Count it was time to get the mail ready for delivery. This had to be done in case the honey bucket detail—we called them the Pony Express or just simply the Ponies—arrived early. After prepping the mail it was time for another set of the Daily Dozen. Once this was done it was time for Story Hour. Story Hour consisted of telling myself a story which I made up as I went along. I particularly enjoyed the trials—I argued both sides and added evidence when my argument on one side or the other became thin. I also ran a cattle spread—I’d spent some time with a Marine officer who grew up on a ranch and he gave me a few pointers. Being a rancher was a delight, as I spent most of my time outdoors. Winters on my ranch, especially the heavy snow, coincided with the hottest of days. I was also a surgeon, but had to defend myself when I killed a couple of patients. Then another set of the Daily Dozen. Story hour was usually interrupted by the approach of the Ponies. A guard would unbolt my cell, open the 3” thick wooden plank door, point at my Honey Bucket, and grunt. (The guards were not permitted to talk to us—they’d all read a Vietnamese translation of “The Great Escape—Americans were not to be trusted.) I’d place the bucket outside and return to my cell. The guard would shut me in and bolt the door. Shortly thereafter eight of our junior enlisted would arrive with four Vietnamese guards. The junior Vietnamese guard was tasked to inspect the inside of each bucket to insure we were not passing notes. Unless you were being punished, you were taken out to wash by the well twice a week. This was a highly dangerous time since it was necessary to tend the message drops, both delivering mail and retrieving it. After washing, you would wait for your first meal of the day, a watery soup and a small lump of wheat bread, usually containing rat feces. Four summer months meant watercress soup. The four fall months meant pumpkin soup and winter brought cabbage soup. Variety was not part of the menu. The guards would put out four bowls of soup and four pieces of bread. I always hoped to be the last prisoner to retrieve the food. Otherwise there was a moral dilemma. One lump of bread always looked bigger, one bowl a bit fuller. In fact, differences were infinitesimally small, if they existed at all. A dent in the bottom of a bowl gave the illusion of fullness, an air bubble in the bread made it appear larger. If I took the “larger” portion, I suffered shame for days. If I took the smaller portion, the pains of starvation seemed trebled. If I was last to collect the food, I avoided the moral issue until the next feeding. After the noon meal the guards would lock us in and then entire camp would sleep. After the naps, I’d do another set of exercises followed by a walk until the evening feeding. After the last feeding, we’d be locked down for the night, which meant another set of exercises and patriotic hour. Patriotic hour consisted of singing the national anthem, reciting the Pledge of Allegiance, singing the Air Force song, and reciting the Code of Conduct. (Yes, I remembered it from freshman knowledge. I was able to write it down and keep three copies in circulation in the camp. I used rough brown toilet paper and blood for ink.) More exercises were followed by evening church services, and then I’d sit quietly letting the mind drift wherever it wished to wander. All the while keeping an eye on the crack under the door. I was doing a hundred finger-tip push-ups during each exercise period and fifteen periods a day. After about three years I became curious to see how many pushups I could do in a day. Slowly I built up to 2,700. At that point I noticed I could no longer hold the spoon to feed myself soup. I dropped back to 1,500 push-ups a day and was soon able to use a spoon again. Such is the nature of boredom. Occasionally I would be taken from my cell to either be read a very long, boring piece of propaganda or interrogated about some activity in the camp (these were inevitably painful affairs lasting several days...or weeks). I bitterly resented these interruptions. Didn’t they know I had things to do? I would be out of sorts for days and sometimes weeks trying to reestablish my routine. In the summer of 1969, George McKnight and John Atterbury, prisoners in another camp, managed to escape; but were recaptured three days later. During their punishment, Atterbury died a horrible, excruciating death. The other camps had been notified of the escape and extreme security measures were instituted. Intense and torturous interrogation of all Senior Ranking Officers in the various camps, along with those individuals identified as hard core resisters—those most likely to be involved in escape plans—resulted in a nightmarish, Kafka-like scenario. The North Vietnamese tortured to confirm their worst suspicions. Driven beyond the ability to resist, prisoners "confessed" in order to end torture. Truth was not a factor in that ugly equation. Even when broken, you "confess" slowly, starting with "I was rude to the guards". When that did not result in relief—you see how the torturer is teaching the prisoner what is wanted? You gradually increase your confession, first to stealing food, and then to communicating. ...and finally, with time, you confess to an attempted escape. This brings no relief. "And now, we will forgive you, when you tell us with whom you were going to escape." The descent into pain and insanity is slow, a slow and excruciating immersion. You find you are implicating fellow prisoners in an escape plan that doesn't exist. How can you possibly come up with a satisfactory answer? The solution here was provided by the worst fears of our captors. You see, they had already decided which prisoners were most likely to be involved in an escape. Over the course of weeks of unending torture, through the fog of pain and insanity, each prisoner was taught which names were acceptable to the torturer. This process resulted in identifying four of us. "And now, we will forgive you.....as soon as you tell us how you were going to escape." The fog of insanity continued. This time, our captors could not teach us the answer. We were in separate locations, unable to communicate. To end the torture, we had to confess to the same method. The fog thickened. We had all been broken weeks earlier, but the torture went on, seeking an answer which did not exist. It as been repeated endlessly that at last the human spirit will reach bottom; how often do we hear "When they reach the bottom...." There is no bottom. There is no escape. It was during this period that I would periodically be able to escape by floating up at the ceiling from which I could look down and watch what they were doing to my body down on the floor. It was really disgusting. The first time I floated to the ceiling I was curious, but when it happened again, I became indifferent to what the guards were doing. Sometimes, when the guards were out of the room, my daughter, Tracy, would visit me. She’d sit at my feet and softly say, “That’s alright, Daddy...that’s alright.” I found this extremely comforting and I looked forward to her visits. Ho Chi Minh died on September 3, 1969. Administration of the POW camps was immediately transferred from civilian to military control. Brutality and torture were immediately halted. Food and water were restored and sleep was allowed. Six months later, I was able to get to my feet without help from the guards. It has been nearly forty years—and I still need to brace myself against a chair or corner as I stand. In the spring
of 1971, the enlisted men and pilots who had been captured during Tet and now
being held as POWs in Plantation Gardens were ushered outside one
evening. Fresh air and sunshine were a welcome treat, but the Americans
watched with curiosity as the NVA guards rigged up a makeshift movie screen,
draping a bed sheet over a clothesline. They
On February 12, 1973, after the signing of the cease-fire in January,
the first contingent of our 143 American military and civilian POWs departed Hanoi’s Gia Lam Airport for the Philippines. During the following weeks, the remaining
444 were released. The LULU’s, which Hanoi claimed were being held by the
Laotian Communists, were among the last to be released. It is perhaps in the ordination of Providence that we are taught the value of our liberties by the price we pay for them.
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*****
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An HH-43F Story of Survival and Loss
The Dragon-ship sought to be helpful and started dropping parachute flares. The trouble was that the flares were swinging back and forth under the parachutes and this caused an apparent horizon created by the flare light on the clouds, one that tilted up and down. This made it very difficult to concentrate on the instruments while trying to ignore what my peripheral vision was picking up – all very confusing. I called the Dragon-ship and had the flares stopped. Meanwhile we had gotten low enough that my CP could see leaves and we leveled off just under the clouds. We were greeted by ground-fire tracers. Our pickup could hear us, but neither he nor I was sure just where each other was. I told him I would flash my landing lights. (We were flying blacked out, no beacon or running lights) I flashed the lights very briefly and the sky lit up with more tracers. Some were aimed at us and some were between the VC and our forces. The pickup saw our light flash and gave us a relative bearing to him and, as we moved towards him, we saw his flashlight signal. I had the crew chief payout about 100' of hoist cable and coil it in the cabin door way. I didn't want to take the time to run the hoist cable down. I told him to drop it out with the forest penetrator as soon as we came to a hover over the target. The pickup got clear of where the cable would drop; we hovered and dropped the cable and the crew chief ran it down to ground level. The F -100 pilot got on the forest penetrator and as soon as he was in the clear of the trees, I climbed up and out of there. More ground fire. We reeled him in on the fly. We were lucky and took no hits. The pilot, Capt. David Lindberg, was okay and we climbed up through the clouds to 1500' and back to Bien Hoa. The irony was that some months later I would again find myself trying to rescue him at a crash site.
If it hadn’t been for boot leg weapons, I would not be able to tell this story. While at Bien Hoa, I tried to get Rescue to issue us 45s instead of the aircrew-issue S&W 38s but they wouldn’t hear of it. The S&W was a fine gun, but in those days we didn’t have speed loaders. Can you imagine trying to reload a revolver while running through the jungle? Then there was our boss, who was afraid of having a live round under the hammer, even though I showed him how the firing pin was blocked when the hammer was down. And then, they said we couldn’t have the gun loaded until we were flying across the field boundary on an off-base mission. That was from headquarters in Saigon.
On the 21st of May, as usual, at 6 pm the alert crew brought the M-16s in from the alert bird and put them on a rifle rack in the alert shack. Unfortunately, the alert shack was air conditioned and the rifle rack was open to the room. Anyway, about an hour later we got a scramble for an F-100 that went in about ten miles west of the base. We were later to learn that the pilot was our friend, Capt. David Lindberg. We found the spot of the crash; it was in a clump of 50 or so acres of woods. I had four Huey gunships (Heavy fire team) for cover and though to myself that this was going to be one of the safest runs yet. The Huey Fire Team told me the area was secure. The F-100 went down in one leg of an L shaped clearing and as I made a pass at 1000’ over the site I picked the other leg as an emergency autorotation site. On my third pass at 1000’ we could see the pilot’s chute on the ground near the crash with the pilot’s dingy. Another pass at 500’ and we failed to locate the ejection seat or pick up a beeper. I went to a hover, at about 100’, and the PJ was getting ready to go down on the hoist to check out the chute to see if the pilot was under it. Suddenly, an observer in another Army helicopter saw some VC step out of the woods and start firing at us from our rear. They were unable to communicate with us because they had different radios. We couldn’t hear the warning because our frequencies didn’t match.
We took a number of small arms rounds, AK-47 probably, and I noticed that my needles were separating. There is a gauge with a rotor rpm and engine rpm needle. My rotor rpm needle was falling even though the engine rpm was fine. I turned 120 to my right and autorotated into the other leg of the clearing. While this was going on I felt a “slap” on my neck which I though was the mechanic in the back of the aircraft hitting me to tell me to get out of there. (It turned out to be a bullet fragment that hit me).
Once on the ground I shut her down and told the crew to run for a ditch a few yard in front of us. We all made the ditch and came under fire. We started shooting back and all our M-16s jammed after a few rounds. So out came our other guns. The crew chief had a 45 Grease gun he got from an Army buddy, the PJ had a 45, I had a Browning 9mm, and my co-pilot used his issue 38. With the gunships blazing away--and all the ground fire--you could hardly hear yourself think. I had had the radio shop rig my emergency radio to plug into my flight helmet so at least I could hear the radio. A Huey (Tomahawk 18) got into the clearing behind us and we made it out of there. We took a lot a fire and just made it over the trees. When the Army pilot dropped us at Bien Hoa he was some pissed as it was a brand new bird and now had a bunch of holes in it. It took two cases of scotch to sooth him.
My helicopter was fine, just needed a new engine. Some rounds had got in over the armor plating and wiped out my turbine buckets, so the engine ran fine but didn’t produce any power. By now it was late in the afternoon and the light was going fast. They couldn’t secure the area and get a left ‘copter in to get it out, so they called in an air strike to destroy it. They shot the hell out of it but because of self sealing fuel tanks it wouldn’t explode. So they called in artillery and blew it up so Charlie wouldn’t get any use of it.
Meanwhile, we were sent to the Flight Surgeon for an after action physical – required after being shot down. We were told to pile out clothes in the corner. I was concerned because of all the non-issued weapons, handguns, grenades and stuff and asked the doc not to look too closely at the pile. He laughed and told me he wasn’t looking at that, but at us. The PJ had taken a round in his thumb and I had a piece in my neck, but other than that we were fine and patted on the back and sent back to duty.
I was awarded the Silver Star for the rescue of Capt. Lindberg and the DFC for the second attempt.
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*****
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Jerry de la Cruz Vietnam
In December, 1967 I was assigned to Bien Hoa AB, South Vietnam and to report to the 510th TFS, The Buzzards of Bien Hoa. I was fortunate in being able to hone my F-100 flying skills at Myrtle Beach before being sent into combat. I had known that I would eventually be sent to Vietnam and I felt confident and ready for the fray.
I had been in country once before on a quick TDY to Phan Rang AB when I ferried an F-100 to the Wing there. While there, I had a few combat missions in the back seat just for the experience. The most exciting part of that trip for me was landing and taking off on the temporary runway made up of steel plates over uneven ground. The plates weren’t joined together so water collected under the plates when it rained would shoot up as geysers between gaps in the plates when the F-100s were taking off or on their landing rolls. Also the plates were coated with some sort of substance to provide better traction. This coating worked fine when it was dry. Unfortunately, after a rain, the coating produced a slippery surface nearly akin to ice.
After arriving inBien Hoa, my new squadron mates eagerly welcomed me into the squadron and I was soon provided with my hootch (living quarters) in the squadron’s living area. Another friendly face was Leon Goodson’s. Goody wasn’t in the 510th, but was flying for one of our sister squadrons, the 90th TFS. I was also greeted that night with a fire fight on the base perimeter followed shortly thereafter by the tremendous explosions of a rocket attack. I assumed my reputation had preceded me, but I learned that these nightly occurrences happened regularly and were not arranged on my behalf.
I soon learned the quickest route to the nearest shelters. Also, I learned to tell the difference between the sound of an AK-47 and the M-16. The AK-47s went bam, bam bam, bam. The M-16s went berrrp and that was it. We had army artillery units on the base also, so they added to the cacophony. I was told a “boom-swish” noise was an outgoing round and okay, but that a “swish-boom” noise was not okay and to run like hell. I never heard anything but booms, however.
The Viet Cong were deadly in their rocket attacks and we were unfortunate to have suffered many casualties. The rockets were not accurate, but they were launched in such numbers that over time we suffered direct hits on our tower, our chapel, and various other buildings. In one terrible night, the VC put a rocket into the entrance of one of the bunkers killing 24 personnel.
Our enlisted personnel had a difficult time of it. The Air Force built regular air base style two-story barracks as if we were back in the States. When the sirens went off warning us of incoming rockets, guys were breaking their legs running down the stairs trying to get to the shelters. Purple Hearts were not awarded for these injuries. Our First Sergeant’s hair turned white and then he started losing his hair during his tour.
Bien Hoa was an exciting place to be in 1968. It had one runway and handled 100,000 take-offs and landings each month. There were fighters of all descriptions, troop carriers, Forward Air Controllers (FACs), helicopters, commercial airliners, and cargo birds. We had the Air Force, Army, Vietnamese Air Force and civilians operating at the same time. Our control tower personnel handled all this with professionalism and aplomb. They controlled all of these aircraft operating at different speeds and patterns, and contended with airfield damage and numerous emergency landings, sometimes while under attack. To watch these controllers at work was an amazing experience. I stood in awe of their capabilities.
I soon became well acquainted with our squadron bar room. All of the pilots carved their name in the bar during their tour. One of the names I spotted was Mike Hyde. I knew Mike was killed in Vietnam, but didn’t know the circumstances, or the fact that he was a Buzzard. I recently learned from George Elsea, who was in Vietnam when Mike died, that Mike was killed performing a napalm pass on 8 December 1966. [Webmaster note: This paragraph has been changed from its original version based upon newer, more reliable information regarding Mike's death.]
My checkout went very quickly and I was soon flying missions and standing alert. Our missions were almost entirely in the Three and Four Corps areas, the most southern part of Vietnam. Our missions included Close Air Support where we had troops in contact with the enemy or knew of enemy locations, Interdiction where we bombed enemy supplies and supply lines, and Escort Duty for both Army convoys and Ranch Hand missions (which I will describe later).
The majority of our missions were pre-planned. The 7th Air Force Tactical Air Control Center in Saigon would allocate fighters to the different Direct Air Support Centers, (DASCs), located throughout the country in accordance to the requests of the various Army units. The fighter wings were issued fragmentary orders (frags) a day ahead which told the wings which aircraft were to go where, with what ordinance and at what time. With few exceptions, we would fly in two-ship formations. After a pre-planned take-off, our flights would contact the DASC and then be handed over to a Combat Reporting Center, CRC, who in turn would give us directions to rendezvous with a FAC. After making positive visual contact with the FAC, the FAC would brief us on exactly what and where the target was and any other information that would be useful to us. He would then mark the target with a white phosperous rocket and give us directions on where to deliver our ordinance relative to his mark. We would proceed with the attack, get a bomb damage assessment report from the FAC telling us the results of our strike when we finished and head home. Returning to base we would look each other over to see if we had suffered any battle damage. On some of our flights, it seemed that all we did was put some holes in the ground. Others resulted in huge secondary explosions and towering clouds of smoke when we hit supply areas. When we supported Army units on the ground we got estimates on how many casualties we inflicted on the enemy. I dispatched many enemy combatants to the hereafter during my tour. We had a target rich environment in Three and Four Corps.
We also flew what were called immediate air strikes. For these missions we stood on alert. Our wing kept two flights of two aircraft on thirty-minute alert to be used for those dire situations when the Army needed immediate support for a troops-in-contact situation, or some target popped up and there was an immediate opportunity to do some damage. These missions were generally more exciting than our pre-planned sorties.
I found standing alert in F-100s much different from my experience in the Deuce. In the air defense role, our interceptors were cocked at the end of the runway and we were drilled into being able to start and take-off in the shortest amount of time possible. We were on a five-minute alert status, but in reality we regularly were airborne within two minutes. All of our strap-in, start, taxi and take-off procedures were so well drilled into us that we could do these actions automatically and in our sleep. Many times, while on alert in the Deuce, I would find myself waking up while climbing out at night after an active scramble. That was always uncomfortable.
Our F-100 alert birds were cocked and ready to start, but our alert hanger was in the middle of the base. When the klaxon sounded, there wasn’t a mad rush to the aircraft, but a slow leisurely donning of our G-suits and a saunter out the aircraft before starting. Of course we had to stop at the arming shack before taking the runway to charge our guns and pull the safety pins from our ordinance. While all of our pre-planned missions were flown during the day, many of our alert sorties came at night. With the slower pace of getting airborne, I was more awake before take-offs. This was somewhat offset by the thrill of knowing that we would be dropping ordinance at night under the light of flares.
On Christmas day, 1967, we were standing down for a Christmas truce. I was on alert duty, but we weren’t expecting any action. Towards evening, The Viet Cong decided that the truce was over and attacked several of our ground positions and we were scrambled. After rendezvousing with the FAC, we were told that our target was a gun emplacement. The FAC couldn’t locate the gun exactly but had a general idea where it was and put out a smoke rocket. It was getting dark when my lead made his first pass on the suspected location. As he dropped his ordinance on the smoke and was pulling out, the VC gunner opened up with his weapon. He obviously had no idea where the F-100 was as he spun his weapon in a 360 angle firing the whole time. The reason I knew this is because he lit up like a Ferris Wheel at night by firing his weapon in a bicycle-wheel pattern. The spokes were exactly centered on the gun’s position. I don’t know if he was firing tracers or if I was just seeing exhausting gases from his weapon. Regardless, it was a striking sight. Having pinpointed his location, my pass put him out of commission.
The rocket attacks did not abate during the new year and we were constantly busy flying our alert and fragged sorties. As the end of the month approached, we were told that Vietnam would celebrate its traditional New Year, Tet, with its customary truce. Our attitude was “yeah, sure” and we expected to have similar results as our Christmas experience.
We did stand down. But as the day passed on we were getting reports of heavy enemy activity in the area. We were in our quarters and rushed to the flight line on our motorcycles (we all had Hondas) expecting to suit up and launch. I found it strange to see South Vietnamese Army troops crouching in the ditches along the road on the way to our squadron operations building. We arrived at the building and were immediately told to get back to our quarters, get our flack jackets, steel helmets and M-16s (all of these items were issued to pilots when they reported to the Wing) and proceed to the adjacent Army unit who had a large personnel-defensive reveted area. We were being infiltrated by a large enemy force and they were closing in on the base and the squadron operations area. We raced back to our hooches and understood why the Vietnamese troops were in the ditches. I wish that they had told us before we rushed over.
The ground fire was intense and all around us. As evening fell flares were constantly being fired off over head. I didn’t care for the situation at all. I came over to Vietnam to fly. I didn’t expect to be engaging the enemy in hand-to-hand combat or even at close quarters. Nonetheless, I had my weapon and I was prepared to fire on anyone that came close to our defensive position. Happily, the action wasn’t near us.
The firing and explosions were intense and continued on throughout the night, but slowed as dawn approached. At daylight we were told we could get out of the defensive revetment as Bien Hoa had been secured, thanks to the efforts of both our Air Force Air Police and Army attack helicopters. We were soon to hear an amazing tale.
During the evening the VC has successfully infiltrated the base and controlled the runway and had entered the revetments where our birds were parked. An outpost manned by the Air Police was in the direct route of the infiltration and slowed many of the enemy with unbelievably heroic action. The outpost was an old structure built by the French along a natural approach to Bien Hoa. They kept firing on the infiltrators causing a huge number of casualties until they were nearly out of ammunition. Knowing of their plight, some brave Air Police in a jeep with guns blazing drove to the outpost directly through the throng of enemy surrounding the outpost to deliver more ammunition. It was a tremendous feat of bravery. Daybreak revealed the carnage on the enemy that these brave warriors accomplished.
From captured VC we learned that they were equipped with satchel charges and were instructed to throw the satchels into the intake of the F-100. They were briefed on what the F-100 looked like with its gaping intake maw in the exact front of the aircraft. After successfully getting into the revetments, these guys came upon the F-102s which were in the first row of revetments. They became confused because there was only a pointy front end and no opening in the front of the aircraft in which to throw their charges. They retreated in confusion as the Army was mounting a counter-attack. The VC didn’t get a chance to return. We were lucky in that they were in a position to do a lot of damage, but were unable to do so due to their stupidity.
By mid-morning we were back in business. We sustained little damage and the enemy had suffered great losses. Crews were collecting bodies all over the place. A crew chief chalked up a capture when a VC who was hiding in a drainage pipe came out and surrendered to the passing unarmed airman. I don’t know whether he got any award.
We were rushing to get back into the game. There was a lot of action going on both in the country side and in the cities. The Army was screaming for air support. Our aircraft were inspected for any damage and prepared for missions. I had already been scheduled for runway control officer duty. This meant that I had to go out to the shack at the approach end of the runway to monitor our Wing’s take-offs and landings. It was a necessary duty that was rotated among the pilots and it was my turn to go. I suddenly realized that the shack was in an area that was earlier under the control of the VC. The building was a two-story affair with the radios and other equipment on the second level. I was wondering if the building had been cleared of VC. I didn’t want to look like a wimp and ask for an escort, but decided that I would go out there with my flack jacket, helmet, and M-16 at the ready. I drove out to the site and cocked my weapon. My heart was pounding as I climbed the stairs as I didn’t know what to expect. I leaped on to the second floor like John Wayne ready to fire at any thing that moved. Nothing was out of the ordinary. What a relief.
For the next several weeks we were constantly in the air, mostly on immediate sorties. I was flying three missions a day off the alert pad during this extremely hectic period. Most of the missions were in support of Army units in contact with the enemy. These missions were the most challenging and the most rewarding. On these missions we had to have exact knowledge of the location of the friendlies and the enemy. Our approaches had to be carefully planned. Ideally we would never make a pass or a pull out over our own troops. The nature of fire fights, however, did not always allow us to avoid this situation. Nobody wanted to endanger our own troops with a misplaced round. I never worried about a short round, but I always feared having a bomb hang up for an instant, thereby having it go long over the intended target. That was the challenge. The reward was saving our own in threatening situations.
The closest I ever had to place ordinance next to friendly troops was on a sortie where we had already delivered our weapons and were returning to base. We still had our 20MM cannon available. We were directed by the Control and Reporting Center to immediately rendezvous with another FAC to provide support to a downed Army helicopter. We were lucky enough to be in the area and quickly were on scene. The FAC briefed us on the situation. The helicopter was in large cleared area lying on its side. The crew was about 50 meters away in a ditch along side a road, really no more than a cart path, but easily defined from the air. The enemy was on the other side of the road in another ditch firing at the downed crew. I could see exactly the positions of the friendlies and the enemy, but this was too close for comfort. The Circular Error Probable (the area in which half of the rounds would fall even if delivered under exact parameters) of our guns was larger than the area occupied by both sides. Even off-setting my aiming point by a goodly distance could put our troops in danger. My wingman was fairly new in theater so I told him not to make any passes. I elected to forgo our regular parameters for attack, 30 degree dive angle and firing at 1500 ft., and instead do a modified attack similar to a napalm delivery, i.e., straight and level at 50 ft. I would do a slight dive at the end and try to fire at about 500 ft, aiming slightly off the target away from the friendlies. I did not want a stray round to land on the other side of the road. If nothing else I would scare the daylights out of them. I came roaring in, nearly spearing the bad guys with my pitot tube and gave a short burst of my guns. Of course I didn’t hit anything firing at a nearly level position, but my tactic worked. As I was pulling off, the FAC excitedly radioed that the VC were running for their lives back to a tree line a couple of hundred meters back. I didn’t cause any casualties, but the VC were routed. I asked if we could spray the tree line, but we were called off. As I was circling overhead getting ready to make a pass, Army attack helicopters arrived on scene to take care of things. That was an exciting mission.
Another mission
that we flew was support of the C-123 Ranch Hands on their defoliating
missions. The Ranch Hand squadron was stationed at Bien Hoa. Bob Fischer was
one of their pilots. Their mission consisted of flying at squadron strength
practically at line abreast, straight and level, as fast as they could go
(unfortunately that was very slow), almost at tree top level spraying Agent
Orange on suspected Viet Cong locations, hide-outs, trails and supply dumps.
Our escort duties were to fly along side their route dropping white phosphorous
cluster bomblets ahead of the formation of C-123s. We would drop these at
a higher level than the Ranch Hands were flying and parallel to their
route. The bomblets would ignite while still in the air and produce a
thick white cloud as they fell. The idea was that this would provide a
smoke screen for the vulnerable C-123s, at least from the side. In
addition we would strafe and bomb suspected VC strong points along the route
ahead of the Ranch Hands. The theory being that this would get the VC to keep
their heads down as the C-123s flew over. The start and stop points had
to be known ahead of time and the timing for the release of the Willy Pete and
the strafing runs had to be closely coordinated. The fighters had the
easy part of this mission. We were fast and maneuverable. The Ranch
Hands, as described earlier, flew low, slow, and straight. They would fly
their position in formation no matter how much ground fire they were taking or
how many times they were actually hit during the mission. The smoke
screen we provided shielded the Ranch Hands from the side, but offered no cover
directly in front of or underneath them. The strafing runs probably only
alerted the VC that the C-123s were coming and to cock their weapons.
Only one of the hits that I took caused any serious major damage. The rest were minor in nature. Our procedures required us to declare an emergency any time we were hit. On one of these sorties, to add insult to injury, not only did I have to declare an emergency, but I was then told that I was number three in the emergency pattern.
Virtually everyone in the 510th was hit at one time or another, sometimes with tragic consequences. During the year that I was there, we lost two pilots killed in action from ground fire. Two others were forced to bail out and were rescued. We had no POWs taken. Of these four pilots, three had Academy connections. Jim Brinkman who was killed was a fine young pilot from the class of 62. Our other fatality was Rock Shane. Rock was one of our football coaches when I played freshman football in 1956.
One of the pilots who was shot down and dramatically rescued was Ron Fogleman, class of ‘63. Ron went down in an extremely dangerous area under the control of the VC. An Army Cobra, an attack helicopter, was in the area and the pilot followed Ron as he descended. The copter pilot set down close to the downed airman. The Cobra has only two seats in its cockpit so there is no room for passengers. The pilot leaped out, opened a gun bay door and threw out an ammunition canister. Ron was stuffed inside and with the door hanging open and with nothing holding Ron in other than a big pucker, the Cobra quickly took off and brought Ron to safety. The future chief of staff was a lucky man that day. The Air Force was served well during his tenure and I am very proud to say that he was once my wingman.
As December neared I was getting more and more anxious to get home. Being apart from Betty and our two small children was the most terrible experience of my life. I wanted to be with them again. I also wanted to know where we would be going next. I got a call from our personnel center. Out of the blue, I learned that I would be going on a consecutive overseas tour to England. I was to be on exchange with the Royal Air Force flying the Electric Lighting somewhere in Scotland.
I was shocked. I knew there was an exchange program, but I never even thought about being part of it. I had no idea how these positions were filled, but I was very excited about the prospect of flying the Lightning. I was familiar with the bird. It was the hottest aircraft in the RAF. It was a Mach 2+ single-seat fighter. Faster than the F-4, but with the maneuverability of a true dog fighter. It had a unique design of two over and under engines. The aircraft carried so little fuel that even the ailerons were designed to carry a bit of fuel in them. They flew a lot of missions intercepting and escorting Soviet Bear bombers flying over the North Sea. Their sorties were sometimes only 30 minutes, but it would be a thrilling 30 minutes.
What a high. I was going home to my family at last and on to new adventures with the RAF.
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George E. Luck My SEA War
In 1968-69, I served as a test pilot in the Directorate of Flight Test at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH. One of my projects was to fly a B-57 test bed airplane in the development of a new IR sensor for the RF-4C. Another project was to fly and evaluate the prototype B-57G with a low light level television sensor. Both programs involved many nights on the Eglin AFB photo resolution range; and both programs were successful and were deployed to SEA.
I arrived in Nakhom Phanom RTAFB Thailand. Our mission was to interdict the trail complex in Laos and to provide air support for the Royal Lao Forces in their fight against the Pathet Lao and NVA. After two months of night operations, the A-26s were de-activated along with the B-57s, F-100s and U-10s. Ten of the A-26s were flown to Tucson, AZ for storage; the remaining five were given to the VNAF. I led a flight of three on the ferry trip back to the bone yard. We flew the old Pan Am Clipper route: Bangkok, Clark, Anderson, Wake, Midway, Hickham, McClelland and D-M.
The crew members were then up for grabs – I took an assignment in the 56th Special Operations Wing as a flying safety officer. This assignment required me to check out in another airplane. For me, it was the Douglas A-1 Skyraider. I was attached to the 602 SOS (call sign: Firefly). During my check flight on my fifth A-1 mission, I was shot down by ground fire over the Plain of Jars in northern Laos. I got to ride the Stanley Aviation’s Yankee rocket extraction system. It worked like a charm. My right seater and instructor was shot and critically wounded as he parachuted down. After an hour on the Plain, we were rescued by two Air America helicopter crews. I completed the assignment flying 80 combat missions and investigating numerous accidents and incidents. When I arrived at NKP, we had 100 Skyraiders, but after one year, we had lost 40, and after two more years, the numbers dwindled down to only a handful.
My next assignment was to Test Ops at Edwards. I was the project pilot for the RC-135U. It had phase array radar antennas on the nose, tail and each wing tip. It was to be used for triangulating SAM radar sites in SEA.
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Ralph Lalime: SEA Phantom Tales
My tour of duty with the 555th Tactical Fighter Squadron (Triple Nickel) began in September 1968 when I arrived at Udorn RTAFB in Northern Thailand. One hundred and eighty missions later (27 over NVN, 150 over Laos, and 3 into SVN) in September of 1969 my bride, Darlene, and I flew home together out of Bangkok on a commercial contract airplane. Thank you, Sgt Brown. These are a few anecdotal events that occurred that year.
I lucked out the first day I arrived at the "Nickel" when I immediately got into a two-man hooch with air conditioning and a telephone. That night at the big Squadron party I learned the party was a goodbye celebration for the guy who had gotten shot down and quickly picked up that same day. It was his room that I had moved into. A few days later Hanoi Hannah welcomed Capt Lalime to Udorn on the radio saying "When the rice is tall Udorn will fall"
My first combat mission was a two-ship night sortie to Zan San in southern North Vietnam. The intelligence briefing scared the heck out of me with all the AAA they said was in that area, but It was a standard road cut along a mountain road. I got in trouble with my lead when I made more passes than he had briefed, but I saw no AAA and had to get the bombs off. From then on, most missions were exciting, but mostly routine: brief, take off, refuel on a tanker, go to target area, return to tanker and then back to Udorn.
DonThurman
Don started flying a new mission using the F-4D as a “fast FAC.” Since Udorn had two fighter squadrons and two recce squadrons, the wing intelligence center had a large overlay photographic map such that you could look at everything with 3D glasses and see what was there within the past 12 hours. I was a mission lead so Don Thurman devised a scheme whereby we would identify three current targets on the photo map calling them Tgt. A, Tgt. B, and Tgt. C (clever, eh!). Don would take off while I was briefing my flight and walking them through the photo map targets. When I joined up on the tanker, I would check in with Don on a different frequency and he would tell me which of our cleverly designated targets were still there. Then he would go over to the ABCCC and tell them he had some good targets. I would separately go to ABCCC and tell them my flight's ordnance and availability. Of course we had briefed the targets given to us by the HQ, but they were usually what we called "tree parks" and ABCCC would always release us to Don. Upon leaving the tanker we would rendezvous with Don and he would either clear us on to the target or lead us to it. Having studied the exact picture on the map that morning, we all could clearly identify and destroy the targets. Over a period of a couple of months we were getting really good bomb damage assessments (BDA). I even had one guy from the other fighter squadron come up to me one day to ask how I was getting such good BDA!
Of course it wasn't always smooth. One day my aircraft (nicknamed 'LUV") was loaded with two air-to-ground "Bullpup" missiles. I had flown film simulations, firing and hand guiding these missiles. but I had never actually fired one. Today was the day--and Don Thurman was my FAC. We flew out to a big cave which was an ammunition storage facility. I rolled in, lined up, and pickled the AGM. I expected it to ignite and come off like a rocket, but instead it came out to my left then went above my canopy and it looked like I was flying close trail formation with it coming down the chute! Finally it lit up and moved in front of me, but I was not able to control it that well and it hit on the left front of the cave. My good buddy Don called out "Ralph if you can't do any better than that take the other one home and don't hit anything on the way!" I'm telling you if I had to fly that whole airplane into that cave to get that stupid missile inside I would have! Fortunately the second missile came off like a rocket and I flew it right into the cave. Nice explosion. I still had to buy Don the beer that night.
Greg Boyington
Darlene and I had been married less than a year when I went to the war flying out of Thailand so Darlene came on over and lived in Bangkok . I was able to get down to visit her in Bangkok for a weekend almost every month. She came up to Udorn three or four times. Each time was interesting. One of these times, I invited some of the Academy guys from the 555th to get together for dinner with her at an Thai restaurant in downtown Udorn. Unfortunately on that very day we had lost another wonderful pilot named San Francisco. He had been shot down over southern North Vietnam and although an F100 FAC had established voice contact with him, we were denied permission from the White House (Johnson) to go in and pick him up. That was the last we ever heard of him. Naturally, this loss created a strained mood at our dinner, but after numerous bottles of Singha beer, we mellowed out. About that time, the music that came on was "I left my heart in San Francisco". We all went silent for a while then Don Thurman said "He was a great guy" and we drank a toast to him. Some of the guys there were Don, Greg Boyington, John Vickery, Joe Morgan, maybe Nick Kehoe and at least one other.
After dinner, Greg said we should race in samlar (a three wheeled pedicab pedaled by a Thai ... similar to a rickshaw) to the corner bar and the last person there would buy the beer. Well, Boyington cheated... He put his little driver in the passenger seat and pedaled the samlar himself! After that beer, we went home glad that only one of us was going to have an early flight next morning. That one was Greg and it was a dozy of a mission! Greg and J.R. Alley were flying a two ship Ho Chi Min trail interdiction mission. The weather was bad with solid clouds from about 4000 ft up to 20000 ft. Greg and J.R. flying below the clouds came across a fantastic target with multiple trucks and supplies. The NVN were taking full advantage of the cloud cover. The trouble was that the ordnance Greg and J.R. had on board were all Cluster Bomb Units (CBU's) with radar fusing set to about 7,000 ft. That meant they had to drop the bombs above that altitude. So JR with Greg on his wing went back out and then came back and visually approaching the target at high speed they pulled straight up and pickled as they climbed above the fusing altitude while they were in the clouds! Shortly thereafter a recce bird came through taking pictures of what turned out to be the completely destroyed target. The awards and decorations officer in the squadron put Greg and JR in for a DFC for this mission. but it didn't make it. For years after that mission, Greg claimed he didn't remember it but he does remember winning the samlar race!
Napalm
One night, my ordnance load included two large bombs filled with napalm. The target area was southern North Vietnam near Ban Phen Op. It was a mountainous (karst) valley. When we arrived there every 37MM AAA in the valley was shooting at us. It was rather impressive, with all the orange streams of fire flowing up into the dark sky. I rolled in and dropped one can of nape on one of the gun positions. It was startling-- the napalm hit that position, but it struck high up on the karst, so the blazing napalm flowed down, down, down the hill like a giant fiery waterfall! Every gun in the valley stopped firing. When I tried to drop my second can of napalm, it hung up on one lug. I tried everything to get it off but to no avail. On the way home, I was nervous about having to land with a hung bomb and when my wingman came up to look me over with a flashlight he said it was hanging so far down that I should consider bailing out.
Now I was more than nervous as I envisioned myself flaming along the runway when I touched down. As we approached Udorn I encouraged my back seater, Dick Baldwin (a great guy to fly with), to eject. He replied "Hell you're having a hard enough time flying this thing with me, no telling what will happen to you if I leave!" As we were coming across the threshold of the runway I slowly, slowly reduced the throttles to try to make a smooth landing. I was wondering why we hadn't touched yet when Baldy said "I think we are on the ground". I chopped the throttles and sure enough we were on landing roll out and still not on fire. As we turned off the runway and stopped, we could see the crash trucks and there were six or seven firefighters and maintenance guys running towards us. When the crash truck spot lights came on and illuminated us, ALL of the guys running towards us stopped and started running away! By now, Baldy is standing on the wing next to my cockpit saying "are you coming or not?" He always had a way with words.
Jim Carder and the mountain top
It was a clear day over Laos. I was flying Number 4 on Jim Carder's wing. Our four-ship was committed against munitions storage inside a cave at the bottom of a short mountain. The problem was there were gun (37MM) emplacements near the top of the hill. There was only one way to approach the cave and we were exposed to the AAA during the entire time. The sky was full of "cotton candy" (that's what 37mm looks like in the daylight). With the constant circular pattern we were flying to make our attacks, it was obvious to me that one of us was going to take a hit. This was also one of the few times Darlene was in Udorn visiting me and I started thinking about how bad it would be for her if I got shot down today. Thinking this way, I actually hung up and floated turning base to final attack. The "cotton candy" woke me from my reverie and I realized I was setting myself up -- so I'd better pay attention. We weren't doing that well with the slick 500 lb bombs we had on board. With us flying a straight final, totally focused on the cave entrance, the gunner at the top of the hill had a distinct advantage. The ducks in a pond metaphor comes to mind. On our next time around, Jim extended his downwind quite a ways out. Flying behind him in the pattern, I couldn't figure out what he was doing. I should point out here that Jim Carder was one of the best combat pilots in the squadron and I flew with him every chance I could. When I saw him turn final at a much lower altitude I realized he was going to try to slide a low bomb into the cave. Lot of danger was associated with that maneuver so, I opted to provide cover for him as well as I could. I stayed above and behind him and made my pass obviously against the gun emplacement. This drew the gunner's attention away from Jim and he accomplished the impossible by getting his bombs into the cave. I'm pretty sure I actually got the AAA gunner at the same time. A couple of seconds after we pulled out of our dives, the top of the mountain blew off like a volcano!
One night, Jim and I (plus Baldy of course) were tasked with a harassment sortie. At about 2:00 AM we would fly in 3 mile trail at 20,000 ft over a sequence of targets using our ground radar to drop bombs on the targets. This went well with Baldy doing a great job on the radar. HQ gave us the exact same mission the following night; same altitude, same targets, same sequence. We weren't comfortable with this because the NVN were not stupid and we thought they could figure out where we were heading after the first drop, however we gave it a try. Sure enough as we approached the third target a huge white flash lit up the sky near Jim flying three miles ahead of me. It was 100mm AAA. Big guns with altitude capability. Jim called it out to me, but we were on the final minute of our bomb run and Baldy had a solid lock on the target so we pressed on. Fortunately nothing hit us. HQ fell in love with this mission and Jim and I were committed against the same three targets the third night in a row. During our briefing, Jim and I decided to vary things a bit. After takeoff we split up and flew the target sequence in opposite directions at different altitudes. All went very well and then we rejoined and came back to base together, not telling anyone we had split up. We finally convinced HQ not to do that same mission again for a while.
My dumbest stunt
It was a night mission over Southern NVN. Our FAC was either a C-123 or C-119 driver and he sounded very nervous. It was probably one of his first combat missions. The target area was crowded with the FAC, my two-ship and another fighter flight all at around 20,000 ft. The other flight was just finishing, so we held at altitude. All of a sudden, the FAC called out that somebody just went by him near his altitude. We actually were a couple of thousand above him, but he sounded so nervous I said it was probably us and I would put my wing lights on so he could see us. I was getting a little too complacent at this point in my tour. Here I am, mind you, over North Vietnam on a combat mission with my lights on. Everyone in the world could see me, but I was high enough. Shortly thereafter we were cleared onto the target, marked by a burning log on the dark ground. As I started my roll in, three 37mm guns started firing at me. As I was coming down the chute (final attack run) these guns were firing from my front, my left and my right. Thinking they couldn't see me I was impressed with how accurate they were getting. By the time I released my bombs and started our pullout I realized they could see me and Baldy called out "your lights are on!". Now I'm going about 500 knots, jinking, pulling "g's" and trying to reach behind me to find the light switch. The ground gunners really had me. I broke right and a white flash went off; I broke back left and another white flash! I forgot the switch, rolled out lit the Afterburner and looked like a space launch going straight up! After several exciting/scary/puckering seconds I was above the 37mm's max altitude. When I rolled out I was breathing very hard. Then the FAC who was watching my great show asked "Are you all right?" I was so angry that I asked Baldy to reply. Baldy, always Mr. Cool, said, "Ah, rog".
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A Tale of Three Fizzles: USAF Firebombing in SVN by TonyBurshnick and others
Much of the war in Vietnam was characterized by the strategic principle of “Making it up as we go along.” The following story starts with an e-mail from Tony Burshnick.
FIRE IN THE BOI LOI WOODS.
Starting at the South east corner of Boi Loi we started to drop the flare-triggered fuel drums by pushing half of the pallets out the C-123's ramp while flying East to West. It took that flare about thirty seconds to burn through the fuel drum and set it on fire. Fighter pilots would probably call that napalm. Then the formation circled around to the North and when it was abreast of the starting point we turned South and started another line of fire with the rest of our fire load. This created a tremendous venturi effect and soon the entire area was ablaze. It probably took us an hour to take off and start the fire and another hour to recover all the C-123s. I can remember that we had a big Post Beer Party planned. I was drinking my first beer and half the formation was still in the landing pattern. But shortly thereafter we were all on the ground and having a great party. Then we noticed dark clouds building above the blazing area. In no time at all we created one of the biggest thunderstorms I had ever seen in Viet Nam. You guessed it. The storm pretty much put the fire out. True story. The base weather officer had the audacity to tell us that if we asked him for advice he would have told us we would only create a storm. Isn't hindsight great???
This story triggered the following response from Bill Goodyear:
The story about "FIRE IN THE BOI LOI WOODS," in your message, reminds me of February 1966 when Denis Walsh and I did the same thing as part of a fifty B-52 raid from Guam. The mission was called "Pink Rose II." The forest service had placed oil drums in the target area and we dropped a full load of incendiary bombs, the same type used on Japan during WWII. The target area was ten miles side and ten miles long. After all bombers had cleared the area we made a slow 180 degree turn back to the east. There was a large fire, a big column of black smoke, and after we left the country a big thunderstorm, which put out the fire. Same result as was created by the C-123s.
Then Doug Reckenthaler comes on line.
Ditto: 36 ship C-130 formation, each with 44 barrels and thermite grenades in each. Operation "Burn Brae" (I guess named after the dinner theater out in MD). As I recall (I was the airlift command briefer for the morning briefs at 7th AF in Saigon at the time of the C-130 op), these occurred during the handoff from Momyer to Brown, and Brown did not like the operation so it was closed down. At 71, my memory may fail me (this was in 1968), but I think Brown was sensitive to the political aspect.
And Jerry de la Cruz adds.
I was the tower duty officer for the 3rd Tac Ftr Wg at Bien Hoa in 1968 when one of those C-130 missions took place. I remember that the whole ramp and runway was shut down for a goodly period while the C-130s were marshaling, taxing and taking off. It was an impressive sight. I think we sent in a flight of F-100's with napalm after the drop to insure that everything ignited. I don't recall any thunderstorm, but I remember hearing that the results were disappointing. |
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Ron Patchett
Ron Patchett: Flying F-105’s over Hanoi
My wartime experiences were centered upon the conflict in South East Asia in the years of 1967-68. In early 1967 I was flying F-102s in Alaska and as pilots rotated out they were sent to SEA in varying capacities. As a
relatively junior Capt I gladly jumped at a chance to fly F-105's rather than
being stuck in the back seat of an F-4, or worse yet, sent to a Headquarters.
After 6 months RTU at McConnell AFB, Kansas I was assigned to the 355th Wing at Takhli, Thailand and became a member of the 333rd TFS. By agreement between the US and Thai governments, the F-105s stationed in Thailand (Takhli and Korat) were not allowed to expend ordinance in SVN – of course we “didn't” expend ordinance in Laos or Cambodia either. Be that as it may when more air resources were required, the rules went out the window.
During my 7 months at Takhli I flew 104 combat missions (100 missions in North Vietnam). Most of these 100 were to Route Pack VI (downtown Hanoi and it's environs). The odd 4 combat missions were in SVN in support of the Marines and Army Special Forces at Khe Sanh during the siege.
Although there was probably nothing routine about “going downtown,” here is what one could expect on a typical Route Pack VI mission out of Takhli:
An F-105 Mission to Hanoi
An early morning Force mission to the Hanoi area was not a spur of the moment tasking. The Frag order from 7th AF Hqs. containing the targets, primary and secondary, and the tasked units would arrive late in the afternoon the day before the mission. The Wing Force Commander would be chosen and he would complete the overall mission planning of routes, times, weapon loads, etc. Those assigned to fly the mission would have an early supper and try to get to bed early and get some rest.
Alarm clocks would go off around 0200 in order to gather at Wing Hqs about 0215 for the Force Commander's briefing. In attendance would be all the F-105 strike pilots, the F-105 Weasel pilots (SAM suppression) and representatives from the B-66s (standoff jammers), the KC-135 Tankers, Wing Intel and Wing Weather. During the briefing the Execute or Cancel order would come in from 7th AF.
The briefing would breakup about 0300 with the members going to their respective squadron areas for the detailed flight briefings. Those who felt like eating would do so at about 0400. The B-66s and KC-135s would commence their takeoffs at about this time. F-105 pilots would suit-up at about 0430, proceed to the aircraft for preflight, startup and takeoff in flights of four from about 0500 to 0530.
There would be six flights of four F-105 aircraft (two flights of Weasels and four flights of strike aircraft) converging on six tankers. There would also be four flights of F-4 MiGCAP (MiG suppression) from Ubon or Udorn on other tankers. When we joined up with our tanker, each of the four aircraft in the flight would cycle through very briefly and take on a small amount of fuel to ensure the refueling system was operating properly. Then the Flight would fly formation with the tanker as it flew the assigned racetrack pattern – the Force Commander in the lead flight on the first tanker and the other five in-trail.
When the Flight Lead determined it was the appropriate time the Flight would cycle through and take on a full load of fuel. It would probably take less than five minutes on the boom, but it could seem like forever if it was rough, the tanker was flying in and out of weather or if because of weather the high altitude tanker was unable to maintain a high airspeed – an F-105 Thud with full bomb load had considerable difficulty refueling at lower airspeeds. There were times during the monsoons when we had to refuel on high altitude, slow flying tankers when we had such a high angle of attack that we actually had to utilize minimum afterburner just to hang onto the boom. Just prior to drop-off the flight would cycle through for the third time for a quick top off so all aircraft would have approximately the same amount of fuel and be as close to full as possible.
If everything worked as planned, the drop-off would take place on time and at the Northern end of the tanker track up over Central Laos. From there we would head for Lima Site 85 – the clandestine TACAN built on a high karst in Northern Laos just outside NVN. Here we would update our Inertial Nav Systems, join up with two flights of our MiG CAP (they would fly high cover over the Force while the other two flights were roamers – positioning themselves between any threat and the Force) and send the two flights of Weasels out in front of the Force to search out the SAMs as they became a threat to the Force.
We would normally continue our NVN ingress considerably to the west to stay over the mountains as long as possible. We would be flying at 550 kts and between 12,000 and 17,000 ft. As we crossed the Black River and Red River valleys we would swing around from the Northwest and down a mountain ridge, which became known to US forces as Thud Ridge. This ridge, which pointed like an arrow at Hanoi, was steep enough that the North Vietnamese couldn't locate SAMs or guns there and provided some protection until we broke out over the Red River valley about 50 nm NW of Hanoi. (Of interest, and great frustration to US pilots, was the fact that the main NVN MiG base sat just at the end of Thud Ridge and we would frequently see MiGs taking off to position themselves to attempt an attack during our egress, but our Rules of Engagement said we couldn't attack the base or the MiGs until they became a threat. Late in 1967 the RoE changed and we did hit the base a number of times.)
As we broke out over the river valley the SAMs and guns would become very active. The SAM site radars were attacked by the Weasels and any actual SAM launches called out to the Force. If a SAM launch could be acquired visually, evasion was usually not extremely difficult. It was those launched from behind or up through a mid-level cloud deck that caused the majority of the SAM losses. Of the guns, only the 85mm and 100mm were effective at our ingress altitudes. Their gun laying radars were also attacked by the Weasels, so they usually put up barrage-type patterns that we could evade until we got to the target area and needed to stabilize as we set up for the roll-in.
At the target the Force Commander would set up the first flight to initiate the roll-in. The aircraft in the first flight would normally each carry six CBUs (Cluster Bomb Units) that were used for flak suppression. Each aircraft would be assigned one quadrant around the target. As you rolled in at a 45 degree dive angle there was no doubt in your mind where the guns were firing from and they became the aim point for your quadrant. Each CBU had hundreds of bomblets – some timed for air burst, some for ground burst and some delayed – all intended to cause havoc amongst the gunners and prevent their concentration on the strike aircraft to follow.
The strike aircraft would follow the Force Commander and roll-in by flight. The strike aircraft weapons would depend on the target. If it was an area target like a rail yard they would each carry six 750 lb bombs – if it was a hardened target like a bridge they would each carry two 3000 lb bombs. Like the Force Commander they would dive at a 45 degree angle, 550 kts and at 8000 ft with the piper at the proper aimpoint, offset for predicted wind, would release their bombs and start their pull out. They would pull at least 4 g’s in order to have completed pull out by 4000 ft – the altitude at which the smaller caliber guns with their high rates of fire became effective. As soon as the nose came above the horizon it would be light the burner and haul a** out of the target area and back to Thud Ridge – usually supersonic.
Once back over Thud Ridge the flights would rejoin, check one another over for battle damage and head back toward the tankers. It was vital during this phase of the mission to not relax too much for at this time the MiG CAP could not cover the spread out flights and there was always the threat of being bounced by MiGs.
Back at the tankers, it was a small drink for just enough fuel to get home. Recovery at our home base, Takhli, usually required a total mission time of 4 to 5 hours – though one time we had a pilot down on Thud Ridge and flew support for the rescue forces requiring a mission time of over 8 hours. I lost track of how many times I refueled that mission.
After shut down, the first stop would be a maintenance debrief followed by an Intel debrief. We were usually done by 1100, would go get a bite to eat, get a short nap and then start to get ready for the next day if we were on the schedule.
I am particularly proud of the fact that during the latter portion of my tour I was one of a very few number of Captains selected to be a Force Commander – combat lead for the entire wing mission of 24 aircraft going to Route Pack VI.
Tale of a Nighttime Lover:
One night about 0130 all the pilots not on the early morning schedule were pulled out of bed and sent to Sq Ops. They were looking for 8 pilots that had not spent more than about an hour in the Stag Bar that night. The old Doolie philosophy of not having to answer any question not directed specifically at you, didn't register after being so rudely roused and I volunteered I had only had one beer. I was immediately Flight Lead of the first flight - “Get out to the aircraft, get airborne and you'll be briefed on the radio by ABCCC (Airborne Command & Control Center).”
“What do you mean get airborne – don't you realize it's dark out there – I'm an F-105 pilot, a daytime fighter and a nighttime lover!!!!” My protestations got me nowhere and I was airborne by about 0215. Now you've got to understand, the extent of my nighttime flying in the previous 4 months had been all of about 30 minutes for each early mission takeoff and flight toward the tanker. By the time we got to the tanker it was always getting light. It was not to be so this night! ABCCC told us we would hit a tanker and then be directed to a Sky Spot (radar directed weapons release) at an undisclosed location.
There were times during the day under certain visibility conditions that it was hard to pick up the tanker. This night over eastern Laos, with no moon, a high thin overcast and no ground lights, there was no problem picking up the tanker – it was lite up like a Christmas tree. I had had one night refueling during F-105 upgrade and that had been at least six months before – I was not looking forward to this. The Boomer cleared me in to the contact position – a little rough on the stick and throttle, but not bad - “Contact, taking on fuel”. About that time the KC-135 reached the northern end of it's race track and started a left hand turn – still not bad, I was hanging in there – then for some unexplained reason the damn KC pilot “rolled inverted”!! A very quick glance down at my instruments confirmed I had a severe case of vertigo. I told the Boomer not to let go of me until we were straight and level. After what seemed like an hour, the KC pilot finally called straight and level – I snuck a few glances at my instruments and the world turned right side up again. It doesn't sound like much when you are reading it, but let me tell you, living it was one of the more memorable events in my life. The rest of the mission was anti-climactic, except for the fact that our Inertial Navigation System said we were over northern South Vietnam.
Thirty years later, I was talking to the Dock Master at the marina where I kept my boat and learned he was a Special Forces grunt that had been at a hilltop artillery support fire base just outside the Khe Sanh perimeter during the siege. I told him the story of the Sky Spot to the area and he said they received numerous unseen nighttime fighter air support deliveries that hit the NVN just outside their perimeter and held them at bay until the daylight when they could get direct support aircraft in. Could it be….?.
A Meeting of Friends
After finishing my 100 missions over NVN in 1968, I didn't get to go home as was usually the case. Instead, because I was an experienced Force Commander, I was sent to 7th AF Hqs as an Out-Country Staff Officer. One of my tasks was the Hqs liaison for the introduction into Vietnam of Paveway, one of the earliest laser guided munitions. While there we planned a Special Mission and I was sent to Thailand to brief the participating units on their roles in that operation.
While at Nakhon Phanom I met up with classmate Ed Leonard. We had a great chat at the O'Club, especially about his job of flying the venerable A-1 Skyraider. He related how much he enjoyed the Firefly mission – A-1 attack along the Ho Chi Minh trail, but how vulnerable he felt during the Sandy (Search and Rescue) missions. We parted, agreeing to see one another again soon.
Shortly after returning to 7th Hqs in May '68 I heard of a Navy A-7 pilot having been shot down in the Tchepone area. The Hqs followed the Rescue Operation closely during the three days and two nights before the Navy pilot was successfully picked up. The cost was large however – six US aircraft were lost during the rescue operation. I was greatly saddened to hear that Ed piloted Sandy 7, one of the six aircraft, and that he had not been recovered. It would be 5 long years before he was released by the North Vietnamese.
For actions during my duties at Takhli I was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross w/2olc and the Air Medal w/11olc. For my actions at the Hqs I received the Bronze Star. |
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Les Hobgood Traveling to Southeast Asia for Fun and Profit
In early 1963, I was a First Lieutenant Crew Dog in the 40th MAS (Military Airlift Squadron) flying C-135s out of McGuire AFB, New Jersey. They kept talking about Operation Jungle Jim around the O’Club and in the squadron operations area, so when I finally caught on, I was afraid that little war in Indochina might not last long enough for me to get in it. I had been volunteering for every assignment rumor that would take me out of the C-135 and into a smaller more maneuverable combat aircraft. After one of the trips back from a west run in May 1963, I got word that my prayers were answered.
When God wants to punish you, he answers your prayers.
I was being assigned to a new start up unit, the 19th Tactical Air Support Squadron, at Bien Hoa Air Base, South Viet Nam flying O-1s. What the hell was an O-1? Oh, an L-19 Bird Dog, now I knew. My first reaction was hot dam, I’m outta here! Then the realization sunk in. All these years I had trained and yearned for combat and now here it comes... a guy could get killed out there. What the hell, they can kill you, but they can’t eat you. Live fast, die young and make a good looking corpse. All that hype wasn’t quite as cute now.
Blew out of Travis for Clark (no time for snake school... immediate need for pilots it Viet Nam) and then Saigon Operationally, the first thing I found out was ... we had no planes. They were on the boat somewhere and scheduled to be assembled by Air Viet Nam once they reached Saigon.
The planes did arrive, were assembled and Major Dooley, the Operations Officer, was sent to Saigon on August 7, 1963, to pick up the first O-1D and fly it back. This was the variable pitched prop model and no one was checked out in it. After what must have been an interesting conversation with the top brass (us lieutenants were never privy to these discussions, only the results), Major Dooley was finally declared the resident check pilot and hence the pick up and check out guy. I flew with him the next day for 35 minutes and was declared fully qualified from both seats. I took a few local orientation flights to get familiar with the area. That’s where two of us were given a plane for the day and instructed not to break it or lose it to ground fire. Don Wolfswinkle and I did have a tester when the throttle linkage malfunctioned at altitude and we could not advance the power once we reduced it. We were lucky to find this out at altitude, so we managed the remaining throttle position to get us to Bien Hoa before we pulled it all the way back to idle. It did entail a long shallow decent and a little sweat time.
The rocket tubes finally arrived, were attached to the wings and we got to shoot rockets for qualification on September 12, 1963. The 19th TASS was then declared operational, the VNAF Observers climbed in the back seat and we started flying missions for real. Our Rules of Engagement were simple. The VNAF Observer was directing the strikes and we, the USAF Pilots, were only Advisors, so somewhere in every strike mission we had to preface the strike advise with “the VNAF Observer advises you hit the smoke... or somewhere near it”.
The tradition, as short as it was, was to let you have the day off on your birthday. When mine came up on October 1, 1963, I requested the toughest mission on the FRAG list. Captain Don Curtin was the scheduling officer and woke me at 0430 to make an early takeoff and first light landing at Tay Ninh for a multiple mission briefing. On my 27th birthday, I flew five combat missions in Tay Ninh Province. Proving once again that it doesn’t take much jaw work to overtax your dorsal surface. I did contend that I was safer in the air than I was on the ground, and that’s why I flew so much.
Toward the end of October, I got to go TDY to Soc Trang and fly delta missions. It was a lot simpler to navigate and you could see the VC better. Soc Trang was an Army helicopter base that had a complement of H-19s to transport ARVAN troops to and from the battle area. We flew cover enroute, scouted the landing areas, hung around to direct fire if resistance was encountered and generally shuttled messages. On the 1st of November, Dick Whitesides and I were fragged to Bac Lieu for staging of some sort, but we had just landed when we were ordered back to Soc Trang at all good speed. The coup in Saigon had started and we had to be in an American compound till the outcome was decided. The Diem regime was ousted and the generals took over. On November 3rd, I was fragged to Ca Mau to pick up a Colonel Nhon and deliver him to Bac Lieu. He was promoted quickly to General and went on to the ARVAN Staff in Saigon.
On November 6, 1963, I committed the cardinal sin of FACing and lived to relate the tale. Lt. Trouc and I were fragged to Bac Lieu in support of a search and destroy mission with the ARVAN. The ground element was running four APCs full of infantry troops and a command jeep to see if they could stir up any targets. Our job was to get out in front and watch for ambush or terrain problems. The US Army had an O-1 out there too as additional liaison. There was a flight of two B-26s with a full compliment of napalm, hundred pounders and 50 Caliber loitering at about 5,000 feet just in case we needed them. Right away the Army O-1 reported suspicious activity and asked me to confirm personnel quickly evacuating a village. They had hidden in the rice paddies just along a tree line and I came in to take a look. It only took one pass to confirm the personnel were old women and children. No real threat and I kinda felt good that we skirted them and the ARVAN didn’t start shooting at them.
About 20 minutes later, the Army O-1 reported some more suspicious movement that appeared to be armed VC heading for a rice paddy. With the previous sighting of suspicious personnel fresh in my mind, I sort of assumed the same results... old women and children. We passed over the suspect rice paddy and didn’t see a thing. The Army O-1 pilot assured me that we were over the right spot, so we dropped down to about 500 feet and took another look. I didn’t see anything, but Lt. Trouc said he saw what looked like a foot sticking out of the rice. Well now, then we commit the sin... we dropped down to less than 50 feet to make a third pass over the invisible unidentified personnel. That enticed them to stand up, identify themselves and started shooting just as I was about 50 meters away at less than 50 feet above the ground and headed straight for all 25, or so, of them. Enough bar talk and hangar flying had prepared me not to immediately pull up and turn away. All that would do is present me as a larger and slower target. The engine and battery in front of me gave me a little more protection, but not much comfort. Now I am at full throttle going right through the middle of them with Lt. Trouc yelling “they shoot, they shoot” and all I could say was “no shit, no shit”. You could see those guys up close and personal as we imitated a VC skeet flying by. The O-1 was even painted “clay pigeon” gray at that time. It was so close that I could see the empty shells ejecting from the chambers of their weapons and long streaks of flame and smoke belching out the muzzles. No whites of the eyes. The rounds slammed into the paddy dikes and splattered mud all over the side of the plane... then maybe that was Trouc and I leaving a trail. We passed through that shooting gallery and never took a hit.
A couple of hundred meters and a tree line later I pulled up to reaquire the now hostile target and marked ‘em with a Willie Pete (white phosphorous) rocket. I was “calmly” communicating (more like squealing and hollering on the radio) with the two B-26s on CAP inviting them to come on down, join in and hit my smoke. They did and by that time the VC were on the run trying to get out of the rice paddy and into a better defensive position. The first pass was napalm by both B-26s and it caught most of the VC still in the paddy. Then each 26 expended their load of 100 pounders and about 1500 rounds of 50 cal into the remaining runners. In between each pass by the 26s, Lt. Trouc was standing up in the back seat and firing his M-1 Carbine out the left rear window of our O-1. The expended shells were hitting me in the back of the head and you guessed it, one of them went down the collar of my flight suit. It was hot and caused immediate concern. It did take a couple of seconds to figure out what the discomfort was, but I felt a whole lot better when I discovered I wasn’t shot. The whole time Lt. Trouc is shooting, he’s yelling “number ten VC ... number ten VC” at his targets. Later, I asked why, and he replied “they couldn’t even hit us when we were that close and that slow ... they were number ten gunners”. I personally was glad they were not more accurate. The jeep and APCs soon arrived and took charge of the situation. Out of the thousands of VC, OK maybe 25, which had us surrounded in that paddy, they only found about 11 bodies or parts thereof. The rest of the day was just your routine tourist run over South Viet Nam. On the way back to Bac Lieu, we saw a wedding procession making its way along the paddy dikes to a small village. All that bombing and shooting didn’t seem to bother them. When we finally touched down back at Soc Trang, Lt. Trouc and I had logged 4 combat missions and flown 7 hours and 25 minutes. After that day, I never crossed another unidentified target again on a third pass. I did however get low and stay low on numerous times thereafter.
I did, from time to time, amaze myself with my own luck and blind natural skills. On November 25, 1963, Lt. Duc and I were flying Combat Observation (looking for targets in all the wrong places-an idea for a song copied later by a Country and Western singer) out of Kien Giang in the Mekong Delta Area. This particular day, we were armed with four colored smoke rockets and a sack full of Willie Pete marking grenades. Smoke grenades were not one of our favorite marking devices since they had to be delivered at close quarters with the target and if one was dropped in the cockpit after arming, it could get dicey. We spied a small recently constructed huch on the bank of a canal with a couple of sampans were on the bank and one appeared to have automatic weapons on board. A closer look at the huch revealed radio antenna protruding through the thatched roof. Duc gets on the air and asks if the ARVN have any activity there. None. All of a sudden, black pajamed VC show up and unload automatic weapon fire in our direction. How did I know they were VC? They were shooting at me... that was the first and most positive form of identification. We called for air. No air. We called for artillery. Same answer. We watched as they packed up the goodies and put ‘em in the sampans. We discuss our dilemma and decided we needed to at least mark the target. One sampan is already under way and the other is being loaded by the last departee. Lt. Duc holds the grenade outside the aircraft and arms it. There’s a reason for that. I roll in for a marking pass. The last departee makes a bee line for the huch and dives in. Having calculated windage, altitude, azimuth and airspeed, I call for Duc to release the grenade. It obediently follows the VC into the huch and explodes, blowing out the walls and erupting into a white fireball fueled by munitions still in the structure. Lt. Duc was duly impressed with my attack skills and I was absolutely dumbfounded. Log entry “sited VC command post, destroyed same.” That was not my last KIA.
There were more good days than bad in Viet Nam, but December 20, 1963, pegs the fun meter to maximum negative. I flew with Lt. Duy on a river boat escort west of Ca Mau. The boats got in a firefight and we helped out with Lobo Flight, two T-28s. They took out one hut and four san pans. The navy reported the enemy was neutralized, but they did not go ashore to check out casualties. All this was just a “ho hum” day until Lt. Duy and I RTBd at Soc Trang for the debrief at the alert trailer. Don Mollicone, United States Naval Academy 1960 and Bill Coley, Texas Agricultural and Mechanical College 1960 were hanging around the trailer since they had dropped into SCT to trade out one of our airplanes that needed scheduled maintenance back at Bien Hoa. Don and I had gone through pilot training at Laredo and I met his fiancée (became wife) at graduation in September 1961. We formed the Don & Les Desk Manufacturing Company at Bien Hoa and built several desks out of packing crates and moving pallets. The cost to the purchaser varied from a bottle of Cherry Herring to a couple of beers at the bar. A modest cost for such a functional piece of furniture. Bill was a new guy that took a lot of heat for being a graduate of Texas A&M. They departed the trailer and headed for the plane for preflight and takeoff. The departure of an O-1 is not an event to draw a crowd, so we started for the bar. About the time we got beer in hand at the O’Club, all hell broke loose with ambulance and emergency vehicle response. We took off on foot in hot pursuit to find the O-1 in a ball against the side of a drainage ditch at the departure end of the runway. Both Don and Billy were killed on impact and I arrived on scene just in time to assist in the unpleasant task of extracting the bodies.
One young Lieutenant in the 19th TASS used his idle time (that should have been more usefully spent at the bar) to decorate the local landscape with humorous signs and drawings.
Background The huches (ten-man open living dormitories) were wooden structures sided with screen fabric and covered with wooden louvered shutters that could be raised for ventilation in good weather and lowered during inclement periods to keep the inside dry. This was the highest possible measure of human comfort available to combat aircrews in Southeast Asia during 1963. To keep the rains from flooding the floors of the huches, a small drainage ditch was cut around the parameter of the structure and redirected the monsoon rains to a larger ditch that led to a nearby canal. As water collected in these small ditches, amphibious and insect life developed. The frog was the most vocally apparent during the night and would croak mightily just a meter or so from your bunk. Misquotes also thrived in the small ditch. The frogs only saving grace was that they consumed misquotes, the constant bane of huch living. During this time there was the Air Force re-labeling campaign to use the word “aerospace” in every moniker possible. Examples... Aerospace Power Unit (APU) which supplied starting and prestarting electricity to the aircraft. Aerospace News which was a movie short about Air Force Units and Programs.
Story... One evening we were sitting outside the huch telling lies when one of the less verbose mused “I guess I’ll have to ship my rod and reel home”... to which we all gave deep thought and one brave soul replied “what the hell for” to which he gestured toward the corner of the huch where the louvered wall of the huch and the ditch joined. There posted inconspicuously at the edge of the ditch was a small “NO FISHING” sign.
There was also an “Aerospace Garbage” sign pasted on the side of the dumpster at the theater. Then after an evening of singing and drinking, some of us were chastised for keeping some of the more senior personnel awake. A sign was posted on the O’Club door “No loud singing or Fun allowed”. Similar signs continued to appear all through the tour, or at least while Lt. Miles Kaspar was still there.
Delivering the newspaper is not normally an airborne maneuver! I’m not even sure it’s at all recommended. It just so happened that Major Don Schell, one of our senior officers in the 19th TASS, had a brother in the ARVAN Special Forces compound near Tay Ninh and he didn’t get mail but once a month. Don worked out a scheme with his brother to have newspapers delivered by any FAC that happened by there on an almost weekly basis. The plan was for Don to call ahead and let his brother know we were on the way. The week’s worth of papers from the Stars and Stripes collected around the compound at Bien Hoa was usually supplemented by near current copies of the New York Times and any other media rag available. This rolled up into a tidy delivery package. The supplemental papers were rolled up on the outside of the package mostly for protection, but it usually weighed out at approximately 10 pounds. The procedure was for the FAC to buzz the compound to alert the folks of the impending delivery. The VNAF Observer was in charge of dumping the package out the rear window at the command of the FAC. Well I got to deliver the papers on what turned out to be the last informal paper drop. We buzzed the compound and curious onlookers peered up and cleared an area in the open center of the triangular fort. On the next approach, I alerted the Observer that we were approaching the drop area. He mistook the preparatory command as the command of execution and released the 10 pound package. Turned out to be a short round and penetrated the very center of a hutch on the fort perimeter. The “package” went clear through the hutch and came out the other side in an explosion of paper that looked a lot like chicken feathers being blown out of a large floor fan. Needless to say, the occupants of the hutch vacated the structure in a hurry and extended digital gestures in our direction. The good news was that no one was hurt; bad news was there would be no more airborne delivery of the news.
Hepatitis was supposedly running ramped in the theater so the Flight Surgeon asked the Group Commander to order all pilots not on the schedule that day to report to the dispensary for the dreaded hepatitis shot. That gamugloblin put a knot on your butt the size of half a baseball... and it did hurt. Well I’m standing in line at the Flight Surgeons when I get a yell from Operations just down the hall that I had a phone call from Saigon. I gladly gave up my place in line and took the call. It was Lt. Anthony H. Long, a past roommate from Camelot, Class of 60 classmate and damn good friend. He was at Tan Son Nhut with a C-135 crew on an Ops Stop and had a couple of hours to kill. I remembered one of the mornings briefed Frags was an Admin run to Saigon to drop off sensitive reports for 2nd Air Division. A quick trade of green stamps with the assigned FAC and I’m off to TSN in a trusty O-1. Delivered the package and then taxied on over to the MAC parking area on the ramp. Found Tony and we hooted and hollered for a while. Told lies and in the process, a sort of plan developed. Those O-1s didn’t have a hobbsmeter and no one would know if we flew a local. He piled in the back and off we went for a local tour. To impress Tony on the “up close and personal” brand of flying we did in the 19th TASS, I kept it low and fast... well at least 95 MPH or so. We trolled the Mekong River buzzing boats in the harbor and then went upriver looking for trouble. Yep... found it in no time at all. Took some ground fire from some agitated folks in black pajamas. Now since I didn’t have a VNAF Observer, no marking devices and no real reason for being there, those VC only received digital response.
As the time went on in Viet Nam, I recorded less and less in my makeshift logbook. It got down to takeoff and landing times, aircraft number, observers name and date. After almost 40 years, the memories are hard to jog. I’m just glad I took the notes I did. My last two combat missions in Viet Nam were logged on July 27, 1964, each one hour long. Don’t have a clue what I was doing or why. As of that date, I had flown 508 combat missions, logged over 750 hours of flight time and hadn’t taken a single hit. The 19th TASS was in the process of turning over all our O-1s to the VNAF since we were winning the war and the South Vietnamese were going the do it on their own now. I do know that I left for the land of the big BX on August 2, 1964, after a 24 hour mechanical delay in Saigon. The first paper I picked up in California a few days later related the satchel bombing of the Caravelle Hotel in Saigon the evening of August 2, 1964. That was where we spent the night on August 1st due to the mechanical. My luck continued. There was also some unrelated story about some North Vietnamese torpedo boats attacking a US Navy ship out in the Gulf Of Tonkin.
I may not have learned much in this world, but one truth seems to keep constant and that is my perception of reality is not always the same as other folks interpretation of the same piece of reality.
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Earl Van Inwegen Excerpt from General Schwartzkopf’s
Autobiography,
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John Kuenzel
WHERE WERE YOU IN DEFCON II ? Of my 226 classmates, most if not all played a role as Air Force Lieutenants during the Cuban missile crisis as our country assumed an unprecedented defense condition - DEFCON II. Over half of the class were rookie pilots with less thana year in their aircraft. This is my story... It was October 1962, I was assigned to a KC-135 crew at K. I. Sawyer AFB In Michigan's upper peninsula. There was no hint of an international crisis at the squadron level. The Initial indication came upon assuming ground alert status on a Monday morning. By noon we were airborne enroute to Spain where we joined a tanker task force assigned to refuel B-52s flying 24-hour airborne alert sorties from the states. We flew three sorties every other night. Each sortie lasted about 90 minutes consisting of rendezvous and refueling a fully armed B-52. In 15 minutes of contact time over 100,000 lbs. of JP-4 was transferred. My job was to manage the fuel panel including activation of the four pumps. In that respect I was the gas passer. This all was becoming fairly routine when performed three times every other night. I do not recall the exact duration of the crisis but the tension peaked on a Saturday night. The Soviets must have agreed to remove their missiles over that weekend in October. Our crew flew 3 that night. There were reported MIG sightings (never verified), and large ship movements reported over the radio. After that an authoritarian voice announced over the HF (long range) radio to report any unusual sightings in clear text hence avoiding any delay. I never discovered the identify of that speaker but he clearly had command authority to change the world that Saturday night. We completed our missions and remained in Spain for a week or so while tensions slowly eased.
To my classmates, there must be other stories to share about this crisis. I look forward to hearing your experiences at the reunion. In the meantime should any of you over indulge on food or drink my advice is this : loosen your belt, let’er rip, then think of your classmate who once passed over 300,OOO Ibs. of gas over Southern Spain on a Saturday night in October 1962. Your classmate forever, John Kuenzel |
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Andi Biancur War Story
On 1 April, 1961, following the guidance of President Kennedy, the Air Force established the 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron (CCTS) - code named “Jungle Jim”, to counter the increasing terrorist attacks by communist guerrillas in South Vietnam, supported by North Vietnam. A detachment (Det.-2A) of the 4400th was subsequently established at Bien Hoa AB in South Vietnam. Using the code name Farmgate, and beneath its training cover, its mission was to stop communist guerrilla forces in the south. Farmgate was a highly classified mission committed to providing close air support to Vietnamese ground forces and to attack the Viet Cong.
B-26 on the flightline at Bien Hoa, SVN, 1963 On 16th of August, 1963, I was fragged on an interdiction mission to a mountain valley target in I Corps. For whatever reason, Wells was replaced by 1/Lt Woody Halsey as a crew member for that mission. We also carried a Vietnamese observer (name unknown). We departed from Danang AB in B-26 # 44-35822 shortly after 1300 hours and proceeded to our target in Quang Ngai Province .
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Andi Biancur The Evacuation of Vietnam Operation New Life / Baby Lift
By late March, 1975, the Ford administration had begun planning a complete evacuation of the American presence in Viet Nam. Planning was complicated by practical, legal, and strategic concerns. The administration was divided on how swift the evacuations should be. The Pentagon sought to evacuate as fast as possible, to avoid the risk of casualties or other accidents. The U.S Ambassador to South Vietnam, Graham Martin, was technically the field commander for any evacuation, since evacuations are in the purview of the State Department. Martin drew the ire of many in the Pentagon by wishing to keep the evacuation process as quiet and orderly as possible. His desire for this was to prevent total chaos and to deflect the real possibility of South Vietnamese turning against Americans, and to keep all-out bloodshed from occurring.
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Tom Seebode Mission to Zaire
During May 1978 Angolan insurgents emboldened with Cuban forces and Cuban Advisers crossed into Zaire, formerly the Congo, into the interior of Africa, in the town of Kolwezi, Shaba Province. They inflicted murder and rampage on Kolwezi. France and Belgium were asked to assist Zaire by proving military support. France provided the French Foreign Legion, Belgium provided the drop aircraft. The Legion was dropped into a drop zone of a Soccer Field in Kolwezi at 600 feet using Belgian aircraft, three Trans-Alls and three C-130s. Three legionnaires missed the 120 yard drop-zone. Their mutilated bodies were discovered early by the main force…the word must have traveled quickly because there were no prisoners taken. In the meantime the US was involved in helping to organize a Pan-African force led by Morocco to be commanded by a Colonel-General of the Moroccan Army. They were to be airlifted by C-5s from their respective countries through Kinshasa for refueling and into Lubumbashi near Kolwezi. I was on the first aircraft to Kinshasa from Charleston, AFB, SC as Mission Commander to the Airlift Command Element (ALCE). Also, a contingent of Combat Control Team members accompanied. At Kinshasa we were quartered at N‘Sele, a red-Chinese base built for the Government of Zaire but then empty and not in use. We had no clean water – so we were forced to use beer as a daily substitute…Tiger something-or-other. N’Sele was very well arranged for their taking intelligence of us. The quarters, living rooms, and bedrooms all had inside panels accessed from behind the closets and had camera associated slots fairly well placed. I did not find any cameras or microphones but the hidden passages behind the walls certainly were there. I didn’t go too far in. We had two missions; the first was to assist the Pan-African forces by airlifting them to Lubumbashi and the second was to extract the French Foreign Legion. Colonel Clyde “Mule” Bennett (All-American lineman from University of South Carolina, ‘53) and I were together as mission commanders. I was selected by the French and Belgian contingent and recommended by “Mule” to advise the Legion on proceeding on the ground to Lubumbashi air field and assembling the Legion there for extraction; also, we were bringing Pan-African forces inbound from all-over Africa to replace the leaving Legion who was proceeding to Kinshasa and, thence, home to Corsica. Next, I moved about half of the ALCE to Lubumbashi in the center of the interior of Africa. There was significant destruction and many shot-up, overturned, and burned out cars and even buildings. At Kinshasa we had all sorts of alpha-one intelligence as to the whereabouts of the Cuban led-Angolan forces. We had only meager communications connections about 12 hours each day. It is a lonely feeling to be isolated from continuous radio contact and left much to our own devices that far from Europe or the US. In fact this was the only time in my career that I actually sent a Flash, Top Secret, NOFORN message from anywhere much the less it was from a mobile communications truck in the middle of Africa. We were given a limited number of aircraft sorties to accomplish the mission. As the French bivouacked around the facilities at Lubumbashi and the Pan-African forces began to arrive, we had one heck of an assembly of personnel carriers, jeeps, light-heavy artillery, weapons, ammo, and assorted soldiers in the hot African sun. We even had a reporter from Paris [Le Monde]- who I had allowed to go in with us…there being no other mode of transportation. We began to become concerned that we were making ourselves one attractive target for the departing Angolans and Cubans. With us was a US charge-d’affairs from the US Embassy at Kinshasa. I decided to ask the Moroccan Colonel-General to set up some defensive listening outposts and defensive positions around the two-to- five mile perimeter of the airfield. Me, the Charge D’affaires, and two of my trusted staff sought out a meeting with the General. As we approached his headquarters we were met by guards who menacingly pointed their loaded AK 47s at our sides and back and escorted us to the General who was sitting at a field table with three empty chairs. In French the Charge D’affaires introduced himself and us. The negotiating began in French. In just a few minutes of translations and exchanges, the General could tell that I was ahead of the translation and he began to laugh. I could understand most of the French being spoken. Colonel Alphonso Miehle would have been proud of me. The General began to talk directly to me in flawless English. Consider that at least five or seven AK 47s are still pointed directly at us. He assured me that he would consider our requests and to not be concerned. We left the meeting a bit more assured. The French Legionnaires were the best, most disciplined, and most effective soldiers ever I have seen. The appearance of the Legionaries coming out of the Jungle was better than many American troops going into the sticks. The only problem was that they worked hard and they played hard. As we moved the forklifts and equipment, both French and Pan-African, we began to find playful reminders that some of the Legionaries held some long-standing memories of some of the Pan-African nations now assembled. More than-a-few grenade booby-trapped pieces of equipment ware found, but none detonated. We were lucky to find them or… these we left to remind us of what they could have done. On the afternoon and night after our key military tasks had been met, in a very magnificent hotel where most of the French and Belgian rank and our ALCE stayed, as well as the expatriates who were displaced from their homes and plantations – being almost no other alternative for us. We managed to survive at the pool observing the lovely and tempting ladies who were displaced. Needless to say we were in Rome, and were forced to stay at the pool all day except for the evening. We had to stay there in the same hotel also. Late that evening among many parties celebrating the departure of the Angolans and the Cubans, some of the Legionaries were trying to remove all the liquor from behind the bar (read, “drink”). The bartenders weren’t moving fast enough some of the rank and file decided to speed things up a bit and began to shoot up the bar. As the shooting started I was coming down an elevator with some of the Combat Controllers. As we moved behind large columns with our weapons drawn, the shooting came to a stop. I had to make the decision whether to look for my own airmen in the same previously crowded bar. The bar was up a long series of pyramidal steps. I had to move from behind a column to the top of the steps and find a location where I could see into the bar. I looked around and realized that my Team members had returned up the elevator, and returned with there weapons…they were in position to cover me. I started the long step climb and peered into the bar. Funny thing, all of the bar patrons were either on the floor or had ejected themselves out the door, down the steps and past me, or were behind the bar. There were three French Legionaries leaning against the bar with pistols more or less hanging toward the floor. Colonel Alphonso Miehle would have been again proud of me as I found myself entering the bar with as stern-a-look as I could muster uttering something like, “Allez! Allez! C’est temps pour dormir…!” (After all, my third-section-Miehle-induced French is perfect.) Now, picture that I was equally dressed for the occasion with a pair of khaki slacks, my “dress” fatigues shirt (mostly clean) and a fatigue hat with rank, and pistol at my side. The Legionaries looked at me as-best-they-could from bleary eyes and saturated minds, looked at the bartenders who now were beginning to appear cautiously from below the bar, which no longer had unshattered mirrors or unshattered bottles remaining. About that time one of the offending Legionaries gazed at me, motioned to the others, and they slowly departed the scene. None of our airmen were involved. The party was over. No casualties…just frayed nerves. With mission accomplished we began to get ourselves out on the last C-141 aircraft. We flew from Lubumbashi to Kinshasa and non-stop to Charleston. Needless to say the last workdays even at Kinshasa were telling and without water to bathe, wash, or shave we were a sight. We had been gone over three weeks. Landing at Charleston the shaggy heroes returning from the modern African Punic wars were met by our families…Carole even wangled a ride in the “Follow Me” truck to waive us in. “Mule” Bennett and I later had to go to McGuire AFB to 21st Air Force for reporting; I caught the devil for using one too many sorties to get the job done. I had to respond that the first mission in and the last mission out was to preposition our own equipment. The Legion and the Pan-Africans were happy, or so history now records, and the world continued to turn. I have recounted that which is remembered with apologies due to our increasing age. Please read between the lines and use your imagination for details best not elaborated on.
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Bill Zersen VIETNAM - WARTIME HISTORY
Even though I was officially stationed on Taiwan (CCK), I spent most of 1968 (May) through 1969 (Aug) in Vietnam. We would fly into Vietnam (C-130s) and stay 12-13 days at various places in Nam and then fly back to CCK for 2-4 days and then back to Nam. The Air Force did this so most CCK personnel would not get a combat tour on their records in the event they were needed to be sent to Vietnam for an in-country tour -- 14 straight days in Nam was required before the time went on your records towards a combat tour. On one such rotation, I was at Tuy Hoa on the coast. At about 11:00 P.M., the alarms went off and all us crew members were herded into a bunker near the water's edge. Pretty dumb if you really thought about it, because all it would take was for one Cong to enter the bunker with an AK -47 and wipe out 12 C-130 crews at once. Luckily that didn't happen. Even though we strapped on 45's for our missions, we were required to leave them at the flight line ops when we returned from our missions. This evening a group of sappers hit the base. The ROK's (Koreans) who guarded the base quickly eliminated the problem --seven sappers were killed--but not before several airplanes were severely damaged. There was no flying for us the next morning until all the damage was checked out. The ROK's, when we arrived at the flight line, had all seven of the sappers laid out on the tarmac. When I looked at them, I was shaken quite a bit. One of the sappers was the barber who had given me a haircut the day before and who had held a straight razor to my neck during the haircut. Never again did I have a haircut in Viet Nam.
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Ron Yates Vietnam Remembrances I was transferred from the 68th Fighter Interceptor Squadron (FIS) Itazuke AB, Japan to the 509th FIS Clark AB, The Philippines, in June 1964. I was flying F-102’s. On 4 August 1964, the Squadron was recalled for an actual DEFCON (not practice) in the middle of the night. We were told to bring clothes for two weeks. I threw some essentials into a B-4 bag, put it on the back of my motorcycle, and got to the Operations Building. I was the first to arrive. I was assigned an aircraft and preflighted it and got into the cockpit. The Squadron Ops officer was about ready to brief me, when I saw the two alert birds light AB’s on the runway. He looked at me and said “follow them”! I was about 40 miles behind them but in fact, did follow them and landed at Danang AB, Republic of Vietnam before dawn. I was the 3rd US jet to land in Vietnam that night. For the next 21 months I spent most of my time at Danang, Saigon, and Don Muang Thailand and flew 100 combat missions. I returned to the CONUS in May 1966. In early 1965, I was given the project to determine how to use the F-102 to fire rockets air-to-ground. I worked this out at Clark AB using a CRC table from the Base library and the bombing range near Clark. I then went back to Vietnam tried it in combat. It was no problem in daylight with a FAC to mark target locations, and the squadron was trained in the procedures. However, 2nd Air Division also wanted to use the aircraft to fire rockets at night using our IR sensor. I flew several of these missions using only my TACAN and terrain elevations off a map to determine firing altitudes. After several near misses with the ground, I told 2nd AD this was too dangerous (and not very effective), so the night rocket mission was abandoned. I think I was the only guy to ever fly these night rocket missions. Firing IR missiles (AIM-4D’s) at night was a LOT easier and a LOT more effective. The F-102 was a fine air-to-air aircraft, but was not designed for the air-to-ground mission. Further, the pilots were not formally trained for the mission. The Squadron continued the air-to-ground mission for several years with limited effectiveness. However, the development of the tactics and their first use in combat was pretty exciting for a young Captain. In July 1965, I was temporarily made Detachment commander at Danang. This was not a merit promotion but was due to the fact that my Flight Commander and Assistant Flight Commander were both rotating back to the US and were back at Clark packing up. We had recently been augmented with experienced Deuce pilots from the States (including two Majors) but they were unfamiliar with in-country operations, so I was made Detachment Commander. At night on 1 July 1965, the VC launched an attack on Danang (their first attack ever… I believe…on a major US Air Base). This attack was directed at our Detachment since we were on alert on the end of the runway and isolated from the main USMC defenses of the Base. The attack started with 80mm mortars and then VC ground troops overran our position. They threw satchel charges into the tents and under the aircraft. All of our living quarters and ground equipment were destroyed and we lost seven F102’s and 4 C-130 flare ships. The Marines set up a defensive perimeter between us and the main Base. They counted us off and opened up heavy fire on the VC forces at our position. I gained a new respect for USMC firepower from the receiving end! We had several casualties and one KIA. On that night, I was VERY glad for the small arms training we had at Buckley our doolie year! The next morning, the 7th Air Force Commander arrived with his aide, Capt. George Pupich to inspect the damage. My face was pretty bruised from rocket concussions and George persuaded the General that I was too ugly to remain in-country. So, I was sent back to the Philippines to recuperate. After the attack, I think I signed receipts for lost government and personal equipment for the rest of the time I was overseas! I never knew airmen had so much US currency and MPC in their bunks and bags! Many of us fought in Vietnam using the wrong equipment and the wrong tactics. Worse, we had the wrong kind of leadership, both militarily and politically. I know those experiences molded the rest of my military career and my attitudes about the use of US airpower. It was those experiences that enabled Vietnam veterans, like those in the Class of 1960, to help build a new fighting force that would, in time, become the most powerful the World has ever seen. In that regard, Vietnam was not lives, treasure, and time wasted.
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Frank Mayberry’s Vietnam Experience
In 1965 I was assigned to the 608th Tactical Control Squadron in the Philippines as the Squadron Maintenance Officer. The role of the unit was to prepare for deployment of Tactical Air Control and Communications personnel facilities, and equipment to Southeast Asia. After a few months I was reassigned to Headquarters 5th Tactical Control Group as the Radar Plans Officer. Here I was responsible for preparing plans for deployment of Tactical Radars and supporting equipment to Southeast Asia. In this role, I made several trips to South Vietnam and Thailand to facilitate deployments and received a Commendation Medal for my work there. I was scheduled for reassignment back to CONUS in 1967, instead I volunteered for assignment to South Vietnam. I was assigned to the 615th Tactical Control Squadron as the site maintenance officer for Paris Control. A few weeks later I was reassigned as a Squadron Maintenance Officer, responsible for the maintenance activities at seven Tactical Air Control Sites in South Vietnam. As Squadron Maintenance Officer, I was required to travel to the remote sites to assist in their maintenance activities. I was often at a site when it came under attack by Viet Cong ground forces. I also came under direct fire, but escaped unharmed. I was cited by both the US Air Force and The Republic of Vietnam Air Force for coolness under fire during the Tet offensive at Tan Son Nhut, receiving a Bronze Star and the Vietnamese Honor Medal, 1st Class.
Control and Reporting Post Radar: Ban Me Thuot
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Douglas A. Rekenthaler The Tet Offensive
In early 1968, the “Tet offensive” was kicked off by the North Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong, in a failed attempt to inspire insurrection by the South Vietnamese population. The NVA lost militarily, but succeeded politically, in that Walter Cronkite, John Kerry, and the Democrats in Congress capitalized on the event and swayed American public opinion.
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Phil Meinhardt
COMBAT EXPERIENCE
I was assigned to the Vietnamese Joint General Staff in Saigon to coordinate U.S. support for the Vietnamese. Our small group was located with the Vietnamese next to their Joint Operations Center, and we had a secure phone to key force locations within South Vietnam. My roommate at the fleabag Newport Hotel and fellow Liaison Officer was LCDR Glenn Brindel who was later Captain of the ill-fated USS Stark in the Persian Gulf. Every fourth night, I was the duty officer and only American on the Vietnamese Compound. During my tour, I was all over Vietnam, usually with General Trien (J3). The most memorable trips were to Quang Nai, Mo Duc, Pho Duc, and Pleiku during the North Vietnamese Easter Offensive of 1972. I also coordinated a combined-force, helicopter lightship-gunship, nighttime capability for Saigon during the 1972 U.S. presidential elections. There was fear that the Viet Cong might try to influence our elections. There were no attacks in Saigon while this force was flying. Each day, with the aid of four assigned interpreters, we would report McNamara-type body count statistics to the Pentagon. The reports were neither verifiable nor relevant. When the truce in Vietnam arrived, my job was to be one of the 200 U.S personnel allowed to remain to support the South. Everyone seemed to want my job; I wanted to go home; so they sent me to Nakom Phanom, Thailand with the remnants of the U.S. Vietnam Headquarters (MACV); the name was changed to US Support Activities Group (HQ USSAG). In Thailand, we carried on the war in Laos until a truce there, and supported Cambodia. When the capital of Cambodia, Phnom Penh, was about to be overrun, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC), by message, gave us 72 hours to develop a plan for the evacuation of the U.S. embassy, the military assistance group, and associated personnel. I personally wrote the evacuation plan, nicknamed "Eagle Pull", in 12 consecutive hours on yellow legal pad. About three weeks earlier, I had been in Phnom Penh, walked five potential helicopter landing zones with the Military Assistance Group (MAG), Cambodia, and planned communications; but until the CINCPAC message, the mission belonged to the MAG, Thailand. A week earlier, we had held a meeting with MAG, Thailand, but they didn't want to give up the mission even though we controlled all the forces and they had no plan. At the end of the 72 hours suspense, late at night, we deployed the helicopters (32 HH and CH-53s) and supporting forces to their forward operating bases, lit up Phnom Penh with flares, and massively bombed the Kymer Rouge at first light the next morning. The evacuation was staved off for nearly two more years. When finally executed in 1975, "Eagle Pull" successfully withdrew about 1300 personnel from Phnom Penh with no evacuee hurt, using the primary landing zone, a soccer field. Marines were taken in to secure the zone and then removed. The evacuation was realistically portrayed in the movie, "Killing Fields". I thought the Vietnam War was stupid as early as 1963, but my thirteen months in Southeast Asia was the most exciting period of my life. What can I say?
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George Pupich Viet Nam Memories I Initially turned down the assignment as Aide de Camp to the Commanding Officer of 2nd Air Division because I wanted a flying job in RVN, but after conferring with Lt. Col. (Red Leader) Morrison in the Pentagon, took the job. I arrived some time in April 1965. Lt. General Joe Moore asked me if I was glad to be there. I said yes, but wanted a flying job as well. He picked up the phone and called the boss at Bien Hoa and I was given an A-1E slot in the 602nd Air Commando Sq., as well as the Aide job. Got to see a great deal of the “inside” activity pertaining to the war by being Moore‘s aide, but that was a mixed blessing. I became very disenchanted with McNamara and Lyndon Johnson. Those observations led me to resign my commission exactly one year after I completed my RVN assignment.
A combat loaded A-1E : 602nd SOS The A-1 flying was wonderful. Being a “Headquarters” guy with the 602nd resulted in a whole lot of flying as Spad 4 in a flight of four. Initially, it was, to say the least, challenging, because I had never flown a big prop job or delivered ordinance. It came around and I particularly remember a mission in which I took Dick Matthews with me when he came over on a visit with the then Commandant ofUSAFA, Ted Seith. A ton of low-level delivery and exciting yanking and banking. I also remember RG Head coming in from an early morning mission to a memorable location - Khe Sahn. He was glassy eyed and understandably so. It was one dicey mission. Finally, General Moore and I flew up to Da Nang the morning after the VC hit the base there. As we were walking in front of the damaged area, a wall-eyed Ron Yates emerged. He couldn’t hear very well due to being in a very close proximity to the satchel charges that were tossed in and near his alert revetment. Got to work a lot with Ken Tallman, General Westmoreland’s Chief of Staff. He and I closed down a few bars and then had interesting rides home on my motorcycle. He telephoned me one day and said Westmoreland wanted to present some awards to his AF brethren. I made a search and found the perfect solution. None other than Howard F. Bronson III was up for (I think) a Silver Star for his work as a FAC. How proud I was to read that citation in front of a full-bore press conference that Tallman put together. Westmoreland couldn’t get over how a “small” guy like Howie could have played O line and D linebacker. He made quite a to-do about it at the presentation. Many flying events and political ones, as well, that are too many to elaborate on (scheduling Hq. aircraft on missions that - coincidentally - went to locations at times that allowed Roy Jolly, Earl VanInwegen and Alf Miller to meet their brides). It was, without question, the most stimulating year of my life.
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Ken Alnwick Reflections of an Air CommandoMy first exposure to Viet Nam came as a MATS C-135 co-pilot in late 1962. Our job was to pick up a SF Team at Hurlburt Field and deliver them to Saigon by way of the Philippines. I was fascinated by what I saw and learned on that trip, and when a message came in to McGuire looking for people to fly obsolete aircraft in undisclosed locations, I was hooked. On 20 Jun 1963, following a short training period at Hurlburt Field, FL, I arrived at Bien Hoa, SVN to join Andi Biancur there as a as a B-26 pilot with Det 2A of the 1st Air Commando Wing, code named “Farm Gate.” My nav, Capt. Miles Tanimoto, and I were assigned to fill a slot in the RB-26 program and soon began OJT in a new skill, low-altitude photo recce. Our aircraft was fitted with a variety of cameras and was also configured with a night photo capability consisting of multiple high intensity magnesium flares in the bomb bay. A photo technician sometimes rode back there as well. Our aircraft also had a glass nose compartment and after takeoff, Miles would leave the co-pilot’s seat and crawl into the nose to sit behind a 36” focal length camera to help aim the aircraft at our designated target. Some of our most interesting missions occurred when we would put a Special Forces platoon leader in the nose and fly him along a route he intended to follow the next day, looking for and photographing likely ambush sites. Of course, we would fly multiple routes to avoid tipping the VC as to the route to be taken, and sometimes took ground fire for our troubles. We were supposed to be in Vietnam as advisors, and to preserve this fiction, we flew with a Vietnamese airman “observer” in the jump seat behind the copilot/navigator position. This was a cruel farce. The 18 year old airmen who flew with us were barely literate and spoke virtually no English—and had absolutely no access to either radios or flight controls. Their only role in life was to provide a cover story for us in the event we all died in a crash. Not long after we arrived in country, our recce operation transferred to Tan Son Nhut AB, Saigon. The missions didn’t change too much, at least in the beginning, but, on the plus side, I moved up from the tents and duckboards of Bien Hoa to a third-story apartment in Cholun, the Chinese section of town. I felt like a true soldier of fortune, living off my $14/day per diem, cruising the bars at night with my mates, and then taking a taxi out to the field each morning where I would take my ’45 out of the safe and then traverse the skies over War Zone Charlie looking for the VC. Sometimes they found us first. At times the action on the streets of Saigon was more exciting than in my airplane. I was in Saigon the night that Ngo Dinh Diem was assassinated, 1 November, 1963. The affair began earlier in the day, when Diem’s special police (the despised “White Mice”) began clearing the streets with automatic rifle fire, and attempting to establish a perimeter around Diem’s palace. Somehow, I found myself acting as an observer from the roof of the Brinks hotel, calling in to MACV the location of various VNAF aircraft over the city. As night fell, I retreated to my apartment in Cholun where Miles and I had some weapons stashed. The next morning, Diem was dead, and it was as if a great weight had been lifted from the city. Vietnamese and Buddhist flags flew side-by-side and the despised White Mice were nowhere to be seen. This was a watershed moment in the war—and we blew it. Soon Generals Big Minh and Little Minh and a succession of US-backed non-entities provided a revolving door of corrupt and ineffective governments. Without reforms or effective leadership to rally the country, the war for the hearts and minds of the South Vietnamese was lost. Unfortunately, it took us more than a decade to realize that sad truth. Following Diem’s demise, in addition to our regular missions, we flew some experimental test flights to try out some night imaging and electronic navigation gear. It was not until a few years ago, when I was working on Secretary McLucas’ biography, did I learn that these were probably the first precursor tests of infrared and tactical LORAN concepts under operational conditions. Not long thereafter, the wings started to fall off our B-26’s and we were sent home. ![]() Eighteen months later, I was back again, this time with an operation
called Water Pump out of Udorn, Thailand, where Wayne Kendall was flying Air
Rescue Service HC-54s. My assignment was to go across the Mekong River into Laos to serve as an ops officer for a Thai/Laotian AT-28 operation at Wattay airport
in Vientiane. Essentially, we were the predecessors of the Raven program, but
in this case we provided a true support and advisory role—with the Thai and
Laotian pilots flying the strike missions against the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese
forces in the valleys, while the friendly forces held the high ground. We
worked closely with the US Embassy and Air America, and other assorted contract
aviation assets. I also flew the Embassy Gooney Bird and traveled up-country
from time-to-time, once rebuilding a runway at Luang Prabang and another time training
Laotian ground FACs. My graduation speech went something like this: “You tell
fighters to drop bombs on enemy. If fighters drop bombs on friendly forces,
friendly will kill you.” As a bonus, I also contracted dengue fever on one of
my sorties to the boondocks.
Four years later, I found myself once again in Saigon, this time on a summer TDY from the Academy, where Dick Sexton and I were teaching history. I was assigned to an outfit called CHECO (Contemporary Historical Evaluation of Combat Operations) working on command and control of close air support operations. This study effort took me up North to Quang Tri where I encountered Cres Shields flying as an OV-10 FAC. This led to one of the strangest missions of all. A US 9th Division tank up on Route 9 lost its tread while being overrun by NVN forces and Cres got the call to destroy it. Soon we were getting calls from fighters throughout the theater looking for an opportunity to knock it out of commission. Tanks are pretty hard to kill with gravity bombs and it took us about an hour before a 366th Wing Gunfighter F-4E out of Da Nang finally did the job with hi-drag 500lb bombs. I often wondered how 7AF reacted to Cres’ BDA from that mission. My last sojourn to the war zone came in 1972 as I took an accompanied advisory position with US MACTHAI in Bangkok. I was variously, an O-1/OV-10 FAC advisor, a Command and Control advisor and a MACTHAI HQ staff officer, and regularly flew C-47 missions into SVN. This led to my getting a quasi- unaccompanied tour to Nakhon Phanom where I flew Scatback T-39s throughout the theater, primarily carrying high priority ISR products. Many of these missions were flown with TI Anderson from the Class of ’59. We flew in and out of Saigon and Phnom Phen in the closing days of the war, and watched helplessly from above as the defenses around the Cambodian capital crumbled. We were on the ground in Saigon the day that Bien Hoa went up in smoke and witnessed the aftermath of the tragic fall of Saigon in 1975--12 years after I had flown my first combat sortie in SEA.
Those were my last missions over hostile territory. I did deploy TDY to Saudi Arabia in 1977 to serve as a special operations planning advisor for the RSAF when
the Saudis thought they might go to war with Yemen and to introduce the E-3A
AWACS to the Saudi leadership. Later, I was part of a small team CSAF sent to
Morocco’s Southern Border Region in 1982 to observe how the Moroccan AF was
dealing with the Polisario guerrillas—but nothing I had done before or since,
could match my adventures in the Kingdom of Laos.
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Charlie Diver Dropping10,000 and 15,000 Pound Bombs in Viet Nam
In late ’69, crews of the 772 TAS would load one ortwo M121s in a special C-130. The aircraft was deemed special because the rails, the part of the 130 that the pallets slid in/on for loading and unloading, were specially aligned to make sure one or both bombs would go smoothly out of the back of the cargo door and not get hung up during exit. The M121 had a steel casing about 1.5 inches thick and upon impact/detonation, would destroy anything in a large radius around the point of impact. Initially, the bombs were used for clearing the jungle for immediately usable helicopter landing zones, and success would be measured in two ways: firstly, the location of the impact in relation to where the impact was requested, and secondly, the number of helicopters that could land there immediately. After a drop, normal calls were a ‘PI’, Point of Impact (exactly where it was wanted), and ‘that will be a two shipper and with a bit of chainsaw, a three shipper’-meaning two helicopters could land immediately and with a little bit of chainsaw action, a third helicopter could be on the ground at the same time the first two were offloading. When dropping the M121, the C-130 flew at an altitude of 5-6000 feet above ground, and was guided to a drop point by ground radar-similar to a Ground Controlled Approach, except maintaining an altitude. The air position drop point was determined by taking an offset from the Point of Impact, and applying the forward travel of the bomb from release and the offset from the wind effect from ground to drop altitude. As navigator, I would determine the offset and call it into the ground radar, which would apply it to the PI, and the pilot would fly the headings given by the radar at the predetermined airspeed/altitude. At the drop point the Loadmaster would release the bomb, hopefully it would sail out the back of the aircraft and not get hung up, and the rest would be history. Initially, the bombs were used for helicopter landing zones, but later, other targets were designated, and many of these targets would have a secondary explosion associated with our bomb(s). We went through the M-121s too quickly for my money, and in early 1970, were using the BLU-82, a newly-manufactured 15,000 pound bomb. This was more like a propane tank, thin skinned, but with half again the explosive mixture-of propane and TNT-I believe. It was thought the added explosive would make for bigger landing zones and areas of destruction, but without the thick steel casing that the M-121 had, the BLU-82 did not perform as well as the smaller bomb in clearing the thick jungle. The C-130 could carry two BLU-82s from a weight perspective, but we never did carry two for a drop, due to center of gravity considerations. The accuracy of the Commando Vault program was extremely good, with mountain tops a specialty, where 5-10 meters one way or another would mean the drop was completely unsuccessful. Eventually, in the spring of 1970 other crews from the 29th, 773rd and 774th TASs of the 463rd TAW were checked out in this procedure, so there was at least one bomb qualified crew ‘in country’ at any given time.
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Mission to Katmandu
This is a story of royalty, romance, and death. Oh, yes, and flying. The events described took place thirty-six years ago, in a far off corner of the world. They are recreated here from the combined memories of three of the actual participants.
Background
In July 1941, American President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill met for the first time off the coast of Newfoundland. Their objective was to issue a joint declaration on the purposes of the war against Germany. Just as Wilson's Fourteen Points delineated the First World War, so the Atlantic Charter provided the criteria for the second.
The first three articles read:
First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;
Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned;
Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them; …
The third article lead to the disestablishment of the British Empire and the withdrawal of the French from Indo-China, where they had ruled over Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos for a hundred years.
In 1947, India was given its freedom from Great Britain. The French did not leave South East Asia until after their defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. According the Paris Accord which terminated the French occupation, the Viet Minh took control of the northern half of Vietnam until national elections could be held. However, it soon became apparent that if national elections were held the Communist Viet Minh would gain control of the entire country. This was unacceptable to the United States.
The primary foreign relations goal of the United States after World War II was to contain the grown of international Communism. Three strategies were being pursued.
First, the United States would oppose the expansion of Soviet control of nations in Europe. This was the mission of NATO.
The second strategy was to develop the capability to counter Communist-inspired “wars of national liberation.” The military contest in South East Asia was, in the American view, a classic conflict of this kind.
Thirdly, the United States would seek favorable relations with the non-aligned nations to slow the spread of communism. India and Nepal were two of the leading non-aligned nations at the time. The events in this story grew out of the American policies to implement the second and third strategies of its primary foreign relations goal during the Cold War.
“Scatback” Mission
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, most of the tactical aircraft of the United States Air Force engaged in the War in South East Asia were assigned to the Seventh Air Force with its headquarters at Tan Son Nhut Air Base, just north of Saigon. Fighters were assigned to air bases throughout South Vietnam and Thailand.
Most fighter attacks required the pilot to identify his target visually. The most accurate weapon delivery at the time was by dive bombing. Pilots could consistently place their bombs within 100 feet of their targets using this technique on the practice range. During combat, with less than perfect weather conditions and enemy anti-aircraft fire, the accuracy sometimes decreased from that achieved in more favorable conditions.
If a pilot could not identify his assigned target visually, he had to use ground- based radar or a signal from a loran radio station. Both of these methods increased the expected “miss distance” between the bomb and its intended target.
For a pilot to have good visual identification of his assigned target, he needed a photograph taken from the air. The Seventh Air Force employed RF-101, RB-57 and RF-4C reconnaissance aircraft and unmanned AQM-34L Firebee drones (project Buffalo Hunter) to take pictures both before and after attacks. The reconnaissance aircraft taking pictures over the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos and Cambodia, as well as and over targets in North Vietnam were initially based at Tan Son Nhut, then later in Northeast Thailand at Udorn RTAFB. The drones flew out of U-Tapao RTAFB, a base in the southern part of Thailand, on wing pylons attached to DC-130 Hercules, but were recovered post-mission in the northern part of South Vietnam, near Da Nang AB, RVN.
The officers who reviewed the aerial photographs and determined what targets were to be struck the next day worked out of the 12th Reconnaissance Intelligence Technical Squadron and HQ Seventh Air Force Command Center on Tan Son Nhut AB, in the southern part of South Vietnam.
In 1972, there was no military internet, no satellite communications system, and a very limited secure telephone network. The only way to transport the reconnaissance film to Saigon for developing and exploitation and then to deliver the correct pictures to the pilots for target study before they took off on their strike missions, was by aircraft. This was the vital military mission of an organization known as Seventh Air Force Flight Operations, code name “Scatback.”
Scatback employed a small fleet of T-39s, twin engine executive jet aircraft, which carried two pilots, a crew chief/flight mechanic, and six passengers. When the military demand warranted, the seats were removed to increase the courier cargo load. The reconnaissance film and target folder missions were flown between Ton Son Nhut and the Thailand fighter bases typically during night hour.
During the day, Scatback aircraft flew established routes stopping at the Seventh Air Force bases in South Vietnam and 7th/13th AF bases in Thailand where they delivered official mail, priority parts and picked up bomb damage assessment and gun camera film . Sometimes all of the seats were installed and the aircraft would ferry high level military and civilian visitors.
Ambassador Bunker and Ambassador Laise on a trip from Singapore to Saigon in 1971.
Flying to the King’s Funeral
After ruling Nepal for 17 years, 51-year-old King Mahendra died of a massive heart attack on 31st January 1972. Arrangements for the funeral procession were made soon after the official announcement of the King’s death. Hindu religious rites and rituals do not allow the keeping of a body in state for more than 24 hours.
King Mahendra was born on June 11, 1920. He studied politics, economics, Nepali language and culture, and the English language privately in the Palace. The study of Nepali literature and composing Nepali poems also formed part of his busy life. He ascended the throne of the Kingdom of Nepal in 1952 following the sudden death of his father, King Tribhuvan. Mahendra’s Coronation Ceremony was held on May 2, 1952.
Nepali King Mahendra
In the Nepal American Embassy the announcement of the death of the beloved king created an unusual level of concern. As it happened, the United States Ambassador to Nepal, Carol C. Laise, was out of the country. Ambassador Laise was visiting her husband in Saigon, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, United States Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam.
The Laise-Bunker marriage on January 3, 1967 was the first ever between two U.S. Ambassadors. He was 23 years older than his new wife, who was 49 at the time. It was her first marriage, his second. He held the title of U.S. Ambassador-at-Large at the time of their wedding in Katmandu, where Bunker planned to make his headquarters between trouble-shooting missions around the world.
Ambassadors Bunker and Laise in Katmandu in 1971
Shortly after their wedding, President Johnson asked Ambassador Bunker to take the post in Saigon. As part of the negotiation, he offered Bunker the use of an airplane to fly between Saigon and Katmandu to visit his new wife every month. (See selection from oral history account in the appendix to this paper.)
Ambassador Bunker’s airplane was a VC-118A Liftmaster, serial number 51-3827.
VC-118A Liftmaster, serial number 51-3827 aircrew (1970-’71) included flight engineers CMSgt Bobby McCasland (L) and TSgt Larry Fritts (M) with their aircraft commander/instructor pilot Maj Dossy Merritt (R)
Scatback also had two other C-118As, serial numbers 53-3231 and 53-3304. However, these aircraft were not “VC” (for VIP) models.
The C-118 was a military variation of the Douglas DC-6 commercial airliner. The VC-118 differs from the standard DC-6 configuration in that the aft fuselage was converted into a stateroom; the main cabin seated 24 passengers, or could be made into 12 "sleeper" berths. The cruising speed was 230 knots.
The flights to and from Katmandu were popular with the staffs of the two embassies and with space available military personnel heading for R&Rs. The flights took most of a day, but the ride was comfortable and the accommodations on board were excellent.
In those days, the communications out of Nepal were not the most reliable. In fact, there was no direct phone service between Katmandu and Saigon in 1972. Ambassador Bunker found that Amateur Radio was the only way he could communicate by voice with his wife. Utilizing a Military Amateur Radio System (MARS) station at Ton Son Nhut Air Base in Saigon, Bunker had a weekly chit-chat with his wife
in Nepal.
The slow communication in the area meant that by the time Ambassador Laise had been notified of King Mahendra’s funeral in Katmandu, there wasn’t time to make the seven-and-a-half hour trip required by their VC-118A. The T-39, which cruised at 430 knots, would take only four hours flying time for the trip.
The T-39 Flight
Scatback T-39A, serial number 61-0675, was selected for this mission. This aircraft was the only T-39 in the organization with a High Frequency Single Side-Band (HF-SSB) radio for long range communications. It had been the dedicated aircraft for Lieutenant General “Spike” Momyer, when he was the Seventh Air Force
Commander.
Ambassador Laise’s flight to Katmandu took off from Ton Son Nhut around 0400 hours on February 1, 1972. The aircraft flew over Phnom Penh, Cambodia and refueled at Don Muang Air Base just outside Bangkok, Thailand. This leg of the flight was a little over 400 nautical miles.
The next leg of the journey flew over Rangoon, Burma and on to a refueling stop at Calcutta, India. This was the longest leg of the flight, almost 900 nautical miles. The U.S. State Department had made all arrangements for overflight approvals from the foreign nations between Saigon and Katmandu.
India had recently engaged in their war with Pakistan that led to the emergence of an independent Bangladesh. Reminders of the recent conflict--sandbag bunkers and anti-aircraft batteries--were still on the airfield. The United States had supported Pakistan during this conflict and the presence of a United States Air Force jet with clear markings was not a welcome sight. Still, the Indian officials did not wish to delay the flight unduly-- Ambassador Laise had spent eleven years in the Foreign Service as one of the State Department's top Asia experts and she was highly respected in India. The officials settled for requiring the crew to fill out a lengthy flight plan form that included all sorts of unusual data requests.
The final leg of the flight was a little less than 400 nautical miles. The T-39 flew northwest to Patna, India and then due north to Katmandu. The distance from Patna to Katmandu is only 130 nautical miles.
In 1972, Patna was the last location with a VOR navigation radio station. Katmandu had a low frequency non-directional radio beacon, but the T-39 did not have a functioning ADF receiver for that type of navigation aid. The pilots depended on “pilotage” to find the airport at Katmandu, which means they look out the window, then look at their map, and try to find points of common identification on both.
Nepal is landlocked in a strategic location between China and India and contains eight of world's 10 highest peaks, including Mount Everest and Kanchenjunga - the world's tallest and third tallest - on the borders with China and India respectively. Mount Everest is 29,030 feet above sea level. The T-39 pilots on this flight knew that Mount Everest was the world’s tallest peak. They did not realize that many of those other beautiful snow-covered mountains were almost as tall.
As the aircraft entered Nepalese airspace, Ambassador Laise came forward and stood between the pilots, asking “Where are we?” The two pilots looked out the window, then at their maps, then at each other, and replied, “We do not know.” {One of the pilots recently reread this section and said, “I have never been lost, I always knew where I was. I just didn't know where everything else was.}
Prudently, the Ambassador, who had made the trip many times, remained between the pilots until she sighted Katmandu down to the left. “There it is,” she said and returned to her seat in the back of the aircraft.
When the pilots finally contacted the airport control tower at Tribhuvan International Airport, a crisp British accented voice came back on the airways, “Roger, Scatback Echo. Call entering the valley.” With tall mountains on all sides, the only approach was to circle down over the airport until the traffic pattern was reached. The runway was only 6,000 feet long and had an altitude of 4,390 feet above sea level. The combination of altitude and short runway was why few jet aircraft attempted to land at Katmandu in those days.
Scatback Echo was directed to park on the ramp a good distance from the main terminal. One car and a large group of local men greeted the aircraft. Many men wanted the honor of helping Ambassador Laise with her things. One lady from her staff escorted her to the waiting car and she was off to prepare for the King’s funeral. Mission accomplished, except that the aircraft and its crew still had 1,700 nautical miles to go to reach home base in Saigon.
The airport officials provided weather information and processed the flight plan request. They followed the same procedure as the Indian officials in Calcutta, with each man in the approval chain demanding his own opportunity to examine each sheet of paper and ask his own questions, just as if he had not been sitting ten feet away in the same room while the last official conducted his examination. In due course, the flight was approved. That is when the crew learned that the one telephone land-line to India for flight data requests was not in operation that day. Katmandu tower was willing to clear the flight to the border, but no further.
At this point the HF-SSB radio in the T-39 really proved its value. A radio call was made to Calcutta Radio, requesting flight plan approval from the Indian national air traffic control in Delhi. The request was relayed from Calcutta to Delhi via land-line and the crew was told to stand-by. A ground power cart was started for electrical power to keep the radio on the air. It was two hours before the Delhi air traffic control approved the flight.
Ambassador Laise (right) followed by a member of her staff. Pilot Bill Goodyear is partially blocked behind Amb Laise. Pilot Dick Miller can be seen in center of picture. An official from embassy with back to camera was arranging service for the aircraft. This picture taken by crew chief, Bobby Thrower, at Katmandu, Nepal, February 1, 1972.
During the wait the crew allowed some of the Nepalese children gathered around the aircraft to come aboard. One at a time, each was allowed to sit in the pilot’s seat with the radio headset on and wave to his friends outside. What a thrill for 8 to 14-year-old boys!
No girls sat in the aircraft. Being near the Ambassador’s airplane was a privilege reserved for males only. But on the way to the end of the runway for takeoff, the crew saw a large group of women and girls waving energetically.
The T-39 arrived in Calcutta, without the Ambassador on board, and the Indian air traffic control delay continued. Finally, with only thirty minutes before sunset, the flight was cleared to take off. The timing of this clearance was important. The flight had to overfly the Rangoon Flight Information Region and the diplomatic overflight approval granted to the U.S. State Department did not allow night flights.
During all the ground delay the T-39 crew reread the Flight Information Supplement and discovered that the Rangoon FIR extended from the surface to 40,000 feet. On this evening Scatback Echo climbed to 41,000 feet, turned east high over the Bay of Bengal without a word to anyone. When the moon came up with Rangoon straight ahead and Mandalay to the left, the crew could almost hear Rudyard Kipling’s famous words:
On the road to Mandalay,
With a strong tailwind and the reduced fuel consumption of two jet engines at high altitude, no refueling in Bangkok was required. It was non-stop all the way back to Saigon.
The Flight Crew
It was a flight to remember for the Scatback T-39 crew: Major Dick Miller, Major Bill Goodyear and Staff Sergeant Bobby Thrower.
Dick Miller, Mission Commander
When their three children were in college, Dick and his wife of 51 years, Lillian, sold their house, their cars and almost everything else they had and moved onto a 37' sail boat. For almost six years, they fulfilled the dream of so many as they sailed the Atlantic and the Caribbean. When Dick’s mother became very ill they sailed into Pensacola, Florida and liked it so much that they stayed. Dick became very active in the Navy yacht club and for seven years was the primary race sponsor for sail boat races.
The next adventure involved selling the boat and buying an airplane. Hurricane Ivan tried to destroy it but with Dick’s maintenance skills and help from some friends, they managed to put it back together. Its last flight came when engine quit just after a touch and go landing. Dick was over a gravel pit with trees on both sides. His landing wasn't all that good. In fact, he totaled the plane and almost bought the farm. He still hangs out at the airport and flies with friends, but is not ready to get another airplane himself.
Dick and Lillian have enjoyed traveling Space A to Europe and plan to do that trip again in the future. He says he is satisfied these days with just being an old retired Air Force Vet, “…and that suits me just fine because I am with a lot of really great people”.
Bill Goodyear, Pilot
After retiring from the Air Force in 1984, Bill tried to open a gold mine in Arizona. He ended up losing his life savings and for penance worked for one year as a civilian in the Pentagon. The next year he became the general manager of a country club near Sarasota, FL. It went broke as well. Northrop Grumman, his next employer, fared better; Bill held the position of business development manager for the B-2 (Stealth) bomber for 15 years before retiring for good in 2001.
Bill and his wife, Linda, a former college professor, divide their time between Atlanta (where their grandchildren live) and Cashiers, NC (where the temperature is very livable in the summer). In 2006, after not flying for thirty-two years, Bill earned his private pilot’s license. He is now teaching grandson Drew the joys of flying in a rented Piper Warrior they fly out of DeKalb-Peachtree airport in Atlanta.
Bobby Thrower, Crew Chief
Bobby enjoyed being reunited with his wife and two children, touring the local area, and making short trips to London and Scotland. During their three years in England, the Thrower family had the opportunity to live in the local economy as well as in base housing. At the end of this time, they all returned to America and Bobby returned to civilian life. Within two weeks, he had a job and was closing on a house.
The job that marked Bobby’s civilian career was as a mechanic with the North Carolina Department of Transportation. Working on all types of heavy equipment, he became a specialist in rebuilding and testing transmissions and hydraulic systems. The Department of Transportation used his skills in all 125 of the State’s shops, solving equipment problems as a Diagnostic Technician.
Bobby was promoted to manager, overseeing the work of four shops and 35 employees, but still found time to attend night school and earn several college degrees. In the course of his career, he was often called on to do unusual jobs and to represent DOT functions and management. Once he was asked to explain the duties of a Diagnostic Technician: “I do what others can’t or won’t do, mostly what they won’t do,” he said.
Bobby Thrower is now retired, living near Raleigh, North Carolina, helping his children as they become young adults. His passion is in restoring his 1977 Dodge truck and traveling across the country. After a scare with his heart and a six bypass surgery, he is following the doctor’s orders and says he has not felt this good since leaving Scatback.
Appendix
ELLSWORTH BUNKER ORAL HISTORY, INTERVIEW I Transcript, Ellsworth Bunker Oral History Interview I, 12/9/80, by Michael L. Gillette, Internet Copy, LBJ Library.
DATE: December 9, 1980
INTERVIEWEE: ELLSWORTH BUNKER
INTERVIEWER: MICHAEL L. GILLETTE
PLACE: Ambassador Bunker's residence, Washington, D.C.
G: Let's start with your appointment, Ambassador Bunker. Do you recall the circumstances under which you were chosen ambassador to Vietnam?
B: Yes, I remember how it occurred. I had been asked by Secretary [Dean] Rusk to go to Buenos Aires to head our mission to the OAS meeting. He had to leave, asked me to come there and take his place. I was then in Nepal.
On the way back from Buenos Aires to Washington, I had a message from him [the President] which I received in Sao Paulo saying he would like to see me on my return. I got back on a Saturday, went to see him, and [they] said, "The President is in Texas, but he would like to see you Tuesday morning on his return. But I forewarn you, he wants you to go to Vietnam." So I went to see the President on Tuesday morning, and he said he wanted me to go to Vietnam.
Well, I at first said, "Well, you know, Mr. President, you've just appointed me ambassador-at-large and I was married last month in Katmandu. I really have to consult Carol [Laise]." He said, "That's right, you do. I'll give you a plane.
You go out to Katmandu and consult Carol, and then meet me in Guam." He said, "I want you to go because it's the most important issue facing us today in our foreign affairs. I think it's very important that you should go out there and take over."
So I did go out. I cabled my wife that I would be there probably for only a few days. And as I got off the plane she said, "Well, I know the answer."
But the President said to me, "I'm going to give you a plane. I want you to go see Carol every month."
I did get the plane, of course. I didn't get up every month either.
But when I couldn't go, I would send the plane up to Katmandu and she would come to Saigon. It became a very popular flight because there were extra seats--I think some thirty extra seats in the plane--and we had a long line waiting for R-and-R in Katmandu.
So it was always full, whether I sent it up for her, or whether I went up myself. It was a feature that added greatly to my satisfaction and situation.
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SEA Recollections
During the 'Cold War,' I was assigned to the 963rd AEW&C (Airborne Early Warning & Control) Squadron of the 552nd AEW&C Wing at McClellan flying RC-121Ds. I averaged the regulation maximum of 110 hours per month keeping our western borders under constant surveillance lest the Russians try anything stupid. During the Cuban missile crisis, the Wing was at max effort, keeping all five stations from Baja to the Aleutians online 24/7. When I wasn’t flying or in crew rest, I sat alert. The Wing deployed several birds to Florida to track the recce flights, but I did not get to go. Shortly thereafter, we started getting levies for guys to go on 179-day TDYs to Viet Nam flying C-123s in support of Operation Mule Train. I got my notification as expected, but--surprise!--it was for a 1-year PCS rather than a TDY. After going through C-123 transition at Pope in the late Spring of 1963, I became the first PCS C-123 jockey to arrive “in country,” assigned to the 310th TCS at Tan Son Nhut. We lived in a hotel in Cho Lon and rode a gray Navy-operated bus to and from work each day. Most of the time, it was dark when we went to work and dark when we came “home.” There was no need for an alarm clock, because the pre-dawn sounds and odors rising from the open-air market behind the hotel were enough to wake the dead. I remember that ‘59er Al Waters had a room on the same floor as mine, but his room was on the street side rather than the market side; so, I guess he needed an alarm clock. The only other USAFA-type I remember seeing was Don Wolfswinkel who was a flying O-1s out of Bien Hoa. Our missions initially were limited to trash hauling to air patches small (1500-ft dirt/PSP) and large (Da Nang, Bien Hoa, Nha Trang, Pleiku, Vung Tao, . . ) and to training drops for the ARVN paratrooper school. The latter were always interesting missions. These so-called “training” jumps were in reality full-fledged combat jumps, because the VC always managed to know when and where they were to occur in spite of our efforts to keep them “secret.” We suspected the little guys who swept out the Operations Office at night were VC spies who knew how to interpret the grease-pencil boards showing the crew assignments for the next day. In any case, the VC were always waiting for the hapless ARVN trainees. Consequently, the ARVN troopers from their first jump onward always showed up with full combat gear, ammo, and rations (a sack of rice and a live chicken or two). In those days, “tactical airlift” was still under TAC. Consequently, “formation” meant real formation–three-ship elements in a V with supposed wing-tip and nose-to-tail clearance. However, because of the small drop zones, the ARVN usually asked us to keep things as “tight” as possible to prevent their troops from drifting off into the woods and certain slaughter. On one occasion, I got in a little too tight for the jump master in the lead bird. He aborted the first pass, because he was afraid his troops would hit my left wingtip when they exited the jump door. It wasn’t that close, but it certainly wasn’t wing-tip and nose-to tail Kosher. Actually, it worked out better for the troops on the second pass, because the VC were just about out of ammo by then and had been chased into the woods by the troops from other elements who did jump on the first pass. One day’s trash hauling mission was less than routine. On 1 November ‘63, I was returning to Tan Son Nhut from a run to Nha Trang and Pleiku, when “Paris” (the Command Post) called asking for my fuel state. I replied that I had about 2 hours remaining. They told me to divert to Vung Tao, refuel, and wait for further tasking. When I inquired as to why (I know–stupid question) they said that Saigon was under air attack. A look toward the horizon confirmed that several columns of smoke were rising. The Coup against Diem had begun. Eventually, our missions were expanded to include resupply drops to isolated outposts as the VC became more and more aggressive. Then one day several of us were called into Ops following our missions. The subject of the meeting was how we could safely dispense flares. There were several crude initial trials to include having the Loadmaster simply pitch one out the door while holding the arming lanyard. That proved to be unsatisfactory, because occasionally a flare would “kick back” and land on the floor of the aircraft--on one occasion armed and “ticking.” Eventually we designed a launch rack made of sheet metal that was installed in the gap between the cargo ramp and the partially open cargo door. The lanyards were attached to the five-point quick releases scrounged from some ARVN parachute harnesses, and the flares were ejected using a shovel handle. The shovel was there to scoop up any “hot” flare and pitch it out. The initial prototype had four tubes, but that was really more than was needed in that we seldom kicked out more than one flare at a time. As soon as we figured out how to dispense flares with a degree of safety and precision, our mission expanded to providing flare support for night strike operations by the ADs and B-26s out of Bien Hoa. The crew complement was usually two pilots, a flight engineer, a Loadmaster, and a VNAF FAC who sat at the navigator’s station with a portable PRC 27 radio to communicate with the ground. When a strike was requested from the ground, the FAC would direct us to the area by pointing to a spot on the map. Once in the area, he would establish contact with the requestor (usually a village chief). Each village had a rotatable “fire arrow” used to indicate the direction from which the bad guys were approaching. The target then became, “so many meters in the direction of the fire arrow.” We would relay this information to the leader of the strike mission who would acquire the target visually and tell us what his attack axis would be. We would then set up our pattern and start illuminating the target. After some experimenting, these missions were typically flown with the flare birds at or above 4000 ft AGL. This put them up high enough to be relatively safe from ground fire and keep them out of the way of the strike birds. Timing delays on the flare chutes and ignition squibs were adjusted for the drop altitude to provide optimum ground illumination for the strike birds. Typically, the flare bird would fly a racetrack pattern oriented 90 degrees to the strike birds’ attack path. The timing of the pattern was such that the next flare would ignite just before the preceding one burned out. At this time during the early days of the war, we were getting a lot of guys coming out of the training pipeline who were just out of the back seat of B-47s. They were by then senior Captains and Majors with a lot of hours but just enough stick time to meet their 60-1 minimums. It fell to us “veteran” 1st Lieutenants the honor of “babysitting” these new guys who by virtue of their rank were destined to be aircraft commanders right out of the chute. Most of the time this was a pain in the butt, but once in a while it became the source of some fun. One evening I was paired with a shiny new Major fresh out of C-123 transition. Since the flare mission was one for which they had not received any prior training, it was decreed that these new guys would ride shotgun for at least one mission before being allowed to fly one as aircraft commander. So I got the rare chance to fly left seat that night to show this fellow the ropes. About an hour after dark, we were scrambled for fighter support. We were directed to a village near the Mekong where there was some VC activity. Upon our arrival and initial set up, we began our illumination of the target as usual, with me explaining everything as we went along. I noticed that on each of our inbound turns for the flare passes there were muzzle flashes and tracers coming up from a bush on a small island in the middle of the river. I pointed this out to the new fellow by reversing the direction of my inbound turn so that he was on the “down side” of the airplane. Since this was the first time this guy had ever been shot at, he was not too comfortable at being on the “close” side of the aircraft and asked that I return to the standard left-hand racetrack. I complied and then asked him if he wanted me to take the shooter out since it made him so nervous. He asked how I intended to do that, and I replied, “with a flare, of course.” He looked rather startled and then said, “yeah, right.” So, I said, “OK, watch this.” I called back to the Loadmaster and told him to rack up an extra flare for the next pass and to set the delays so that the chute would pop and the flare would ignite just above the ground. Mind you, at this point, I was just BSing the guy and really had no expectation that anything meaningful would come of the whole thing. Just having the fellow on, so to speak. As I rolled out of the inbound turn on the next pass, I said to the Loadmaster, “ready, ready, ready, kick it.” The Loadmaster called, “flare away,” and I put the bird in a steep turn to the right, telling the dubious right seater to watch that bush. I kept the wingtip on the bush, and surely enough the flare ignited and immediately fell into the bush, setting it ablaze. I don’t know whether I actually got the little SOB, but that 4 million candlepower flare at least played hell with his night vision. The muzzle flashes and tracers didn’t appear any more after that. The fellow was truly impressed, and I just smiled and never let on that it was pure luck rather than skill that prevailed that night. The next mission, he was in the left seat. We also had a one-, sometimes two-, plane rotation to Don Muang Airport in Bangkok, Thailand to support operations that were ramping up there. We flew ad hoc missions to places like Udorn, Udon Thani, Khon Kaen, Chiang Mai, Takhli, Korat, and Nahkon Phanom (the old dirt strip; the new runway was just being carved out of the jungle by the CBs). We normally stayed for 2 weeks before being relieved by the next aircraft and crew. It was during one of these rotations that we woke up one morning at our hotel to learn of President Kennedy’s assassination. The hotel staff and our “permanent” cab driver , Mr. Suwat, were all most thoughtful and expressed their sorrow at our loss. I think they were as stunned as we were. It normally took about 4 hours to fly from Saigon to Bangkok using an over-water route that took us well south of Cambodia. On one such flight, the monsoon rains had started, and we were in heavy rain for nearly the entire flight. The C-123 had a strong tendency to leak in the rain. Water entered the air intake for the cabin heaters which were on the ceiling just forward of the wing box. With the rain we experienced that day, the heater drains were overwhelmed, and water was literally pouring out of the heaters and onto the cargo floor. We had passengers that day, and they improvised tents by draping tarps and ponchos over the static-line cables to keep the water from falling directly on them. As the rain continued, the water began to accumulate on the cargo floor, and it eventually became several inches deep. Up front, we noticed that it was increasingly difficult to maintain a level attitude as the water sloshed fore and aft on the floor. Eventually, it got so bad that it was taking nearly the full elevator travel to maintain even a semblance of level flight. At that point, we had only one choice. We slowed to 115 knots and had the Loadmaster lower the ramp to be level with the rest of the floor. This time, when the nose came up, we just let it climb. The water rushed out the back with a big swoosh, and all was well again. We buttoned up and continued on to Bangkok. We had to repeat this “aircraft flushing procedure” every half hour or so, and by the time we got to Bangkok we had the cleanest cargo floor in the fleet. I’m not sure what it is about Thailand, but I had two instances of blower-clutch failure there. The first was at Udon Thani on our first day out for that rotation. There was no reliable land-line communication from there to Saigon; so, we had to contact Tan Son Nhut by HF radio using a relay through the only station we could talk to, MacDill in Florida. It took ‘em over a week to get us a new engine; so, we had a lot of time to sit in the air-conditioned Air America club, drink iced tea and play darts. When the engine finally did arrive, we had to change it ourselves, because “they” weren’t smart enough to send any maintenance people and equipment along (and, yes, we weren’t smart enough to ask). We got just a bare engine: no starter, no alternator, no pumps. We had to scrounge all of that stuff off the old engine before we could hang the new one on the airplane. We borrowed some stands, hoists and tools from the Air America guys there, and we changed the engine on the parking pad. It took is 3 or 4 days. Basically, we spent the whole rotation on that one mission. The second blower clutch went out on a later rotation as we were attempting to depart Takhli. This time we had good communications available, but before we could tell anyone in Saigon about our problems, we got the word that there had been an accident in one of the hangers and a young maintenance guy had been pretty well crushed by a collapsing rack or stand. He was in critical condition, and the local medics weren’t equipped to deal with that sort of injury. They asked me if we could take him to Bangkok for treatment. We told them that we only had one good engine and part of another, and that put the airplane on a “red X.” They told us that the kid would die if we couldn’t help; so, we got rid of that red X and cranked her up after they had offloaded all of the cargo and told the passengers that they would be staying a while at Takhli. Fortunately, Takhli had a nice, long runway to handle the F-100s . After a quick runup, we rolled with both engines at field barometric and slowly lumbered down the runway, adding power on the good engine as speed gave us enough rudder effectiveness to keep the nose straight. It took a lot of that runway to get up to lift-off speed, but we got her up and clean with room to spare. We got the kid to Bangkok, and he made it. That made taking chances and bending the rules worthwhile as far as we were concerned. Oh, yes, we 'discovered' that bad blower clutch on post-flight runup at Don Muang. Actually, I only did 9 months of a 12-month tour, and the last 2 months were spent in the right seat of the VC-123 known as the White Whale. The Whale was a plushed-up version of a C-123 that had never seen tactical duty. It may have come from the purely logistical fleet at Hamilton. It was there to serve as in-country transport for VIPs (principally, General Harkins and, then, General Westmoreland). It had a somewhat-insulated compartment with “business class” seating for eight. In the back was a palette of less-comfortable airline seats for about a dozen or so. The skin and props were polished and the top was painted white, not unlike the VIP birds at Andrews. The airplane also had a DECA navigation system in it, with a redundant map display in the VIP compartment. One of my principal jobs was to make sure the DECA pointer agreed with our actual map position (just in case the VIP was map reading?). The aircraft commander was a Captain who had been at Hamilton. He had buckets of hours in the C-123; however, he had never been tactically qualified. Give him a 10,000-ft runway, and you would never feel the wheels touch. Give him anything less than 5000 ft, and he was a nervous wreck but still got it on the ground without incident. Anything shorter than that, he was truly scary. My alleged job was to keep us out of trouble in this latter situation. The only problem with that plan is that nobody told him, and he would only let me fly the airplane if we didn’t have any passengers on board. For missions into a short field, this proved to be rather exciting. On one such mission, we were transporting several State Department folks and some Viet Nam government officials to inspect some project at a little town in the Delta. The airport for said town was a 2000-ft PSP strip with a road and power line at one end and the town graveyard at the other. To keep from scaring the hell out of the locals in the town, the only useable approach was over the power line and toward the graveyard. On the first pass, the “boss” used only normal flaps, was too hot, and floated the length of the runway before going around (right over the rooftops of the little town–that woke ‘em up for sure, and the crowd started gathering). On the second pass, I persuaded him to use full/assault flaps, but he was still too hot and long; so, around we went again. I asked him to let me land the thing, but he refused. Instead he told me to “talk him through it.” This I did, and I got him on final high enough and slow enough for a decent approach over the wires, but since he was not used to that rate of decent he misjudged the flare, and we slammed onto the mains with a bone-jarring impact that launched us immediately back into the air. I assumed that he would go around, but instead he grabbed full reverse. This time we hit on the nose wheel first, but we got the mains on the ground with about a fourth of the runway left. I hammered the brakes, started the flaps up, and hoped the antiskid would work. As the props threw their normal dust cloud forward to engulf the cockpit, I saw the graveyard fence getting awfully close. We came to a stop with the props still in full reverse, and I had to wrestle the throttles away from him to get them back in forward pitch and at idle. When the dust cleared, the pitot tubes on the nose were sticking through the graveyard fence, and what had to have been the whole town was standing there agape. I shut down the engines, and told the Steward to open the door to let the passengers out. They got off shakily and shook hands with the town dignitaries waiting to greet them. By then the “boss” was out of the airplane. He asked when the party would be ready to depart. They said, “thank you, but we will make alternate transportation arrangements.” One good thing about this was that with an empty airplane, I got to fly left seat on the way home. There were many more incidents flying the Whale. Since it was the only “shiny” airplane in country, everyone knew that it was for somebody special. As a result, it collected more bullet holes than everything except the Ranch Hand spray birds. To protect it when there was an inordinately important passenger list going into what might be considered high-risk airfields, we had fighter escort (usually ADs and T-28s out of Bien Hoa). One such mission was a multi-destination mission for which the passenger list included Hubert Humphrey, Henry Cabot Lodge, Robert McNamara, and most if not all of the three-and-four-stars in the theater. It took four stars or better to get into the VIP compartment and two stars just to get on the airplane. One of the VIP-compartment passengers was the then President of South Viet Nam (Nguyen Cao Ky). He usually traveled with an entourage and a security force of ARVN soldiers. There was no room for such folks on the airplane, but to make him feel better, they were allowed to board through the front door and disappear into the aft section. Once back there, the Loadmaster / Steward not-so-politely ushered them out the back door and onto the President’s Gooney Bird parked nearby. The Goon took off before us and landed far enough ahead at the next place so that the entourage and security force were there ready to greet the President when he got off the airplane.This charade was repeated at each place throughout the day. I suspect President Nguyen knew what was going on, but he never said anything. |
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